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An Overview of the Project Cycle
by Kevin Forsberg and Hal Mooz
Projects are formed to achieve defined ob-
jectives, which almost always include a set of
technical requirements to be achieved within
budget and schedule constraints. The Project
Cycle is a tool that defines the typical project
activities and their logical progression from the
beginning to end. Many projects encounter
serious difficulty and often fail because the
project team ignores the proper sequencing of
activities and events in the project cycle,
particularly the "front-end" activities. Studies,
such as the Hearth Committee report (NASA)
and the Packard Presidential Commission
report (DoD), emphasize the importance of not
ignoring, bypassing, or improperly sequencing
essential project cycle events. To comply, project
managers must completely understand their
project's cycle.
Many functional managers attempt to define
the project cycle from their perspective. These
attempts result in the Budget Cycle, the Sys-
tem Development Cycle, the Acquisition Cycle
and many other focused views of the typical life
of a project. Development of a comprehensive
project cycle has been hampered by the inability
of the many interest groups involved to achieve
consensus. Moreover, engineers tend to be
reluctant to create a typical project cycle in fear
that it will reduce their freedom to be inno-
vative during the engineering portion of the
cycle.
Under contract to the U.S. Government, we
have studied and evolved a baseline project cycle
useful for all projects requiring concept
selection, design, development, and operations.
While fundamentally similar to the NASA
planning process that includes Phases A, B, and
C/D, it provides markedly clearer terminology,
and has been carried to a depth of detail not
previously available.
Project Cycle Definition
The project cycle is an illustration of the typical
and necessary project events sequenced from
beginning to end. There are three aspects or
layers to the project cycle, each containing its
own set of events. These layers are the Budget,
Business, and Technical aspects.
The Budget aspect contains all events relative to
securing the necessary funding required by the
project. The Business aspect contains all the
events relative to the overall programmatic
management of the project, including the
acquisition process and associated contract
management. The Technical aspect contains all
the technical events relative to determining and
satisfying the technical requirements of the
project, and validating that the project solution
complies with the requirements.
The interwoven events for these three aspects
constitute the total cycle. Each event or product
of an event is assigned to one of four interrelated
categories: Budget, Activities, Products, and
Control Gates. See Figure 1, Project Cycle
(Partial View), which shows these four cat-
egories of events and related products.
The "budget events" define the required
planning for and securing of project funding and
are keyed to important U.S. Government fiscal
milestones imposed by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB).
The "activities" include all sorts of actions such
as to study, analyze, evaluate, select, design, etc.
The "products" consist of activity results such as
specifications, drawings and manuals; internal
hardware and software such as technical feasi-
bility models; and the deliverable hardware,
software and documentation.
An Overview of the Project Cycle
e_' Fiscal Year
,-- B_c_t
:_'t_l_ Activities
<
rascal _ar ( \
OCT. _arl. Aor. _uL "_
Budget Formu_atlon Year: i FY ÷ 2 ) L )
Budget ReviewYearT ( FY.1 , < : I
Budget Execuoon Year: ( FY ) ( )
A Comptroller Issues Program Call )
A Office Program Plans to Deputy Director /
A Directorate Program Plans to Comptroller /
Periods '-91 Study Period "---//
& User Requirements Definition Phase Concept Definition /
Phases so.,=, sel_ion Phase /Phase (if req'd)
V
Define User Model User Tradeolf Candidate
Requirements--, Requirements--: System Concepts,-:
(/) Develop Initial i Quantify & 'I Identify Risks i
OJI System Concept(s)--: Bound : & Assess :
, Technical:
.-- , System :Validate: : Feasibility-:
_> Requ rements-_ Requirements-_ \,_ ' ' Select System iInitiate System i Establish I Concept--
, = Prelect i(,3 Acquisition Plannmg-_ Control Board--
,¢_ Develop User :
L Prepare Project Proposal--' : Validation ,O ' Define ; Approach-- I
,-- ._ Integrate Project Proposal : Concept i
(_ into Directorate Program Plan--_ Selection : Develop i
_ : Criteria-" OperationalDemonstration
: : Approach--
0 : : :
,¢_ : :
; I :
E User i User & System : Trade Off
Requirements i Requirements : Analysis Results--: /Statement-_ Understanding : t
•t_ : Model(s)-: System
f,_ Initial i ' Concept Document--
_>_ System Concept-_ - Configuration /
_(/] , System i _ Deployment :
¢,3 Initial System i Requirements I _ Operations : /_ Acquisition Plan-_ Document- i Technical"_ Project Proposal--! : Feasibility Model(s)-_O
L Directorate Program Plan-_ Concept ', Selected Concept
I=_ : Selection',Budgetary Estimate: (Criteria-_ "Should Cost"-_
; User
: Validation Plan--
: , Operational :
: : Demonstration Plan--
Program_
-- Plans t/a_:'_l
O (J_ Review _ :
1"-- (_ System
,,b,,,= _ Requirements I/G\ SRR..I
(=" (_ Control Gate Legen<_ I Review System Re<_ultemenrs
O (_ .................... BaINI,in. System r
o oonce0t,,O,.ov__--
Z,:e-e-_._ ©1990 Center for Systems Management, 5333 Betsy Ross Drive, Santa Clara. CA 9505;
Figure 1 - Project Cycle (Partial View)
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The "control gates" are predetermined, formal
status and decision checkpoints which must be
satisfied, or else the project is not sufficiently
prepared to move on to future events without in-
creased risk.
Project Cycle Periods and Phases
The project cycle is usually divided into periods
and then further subdivided into phases. Our
typical cycle is divided into the Study Period,
the Acquisition Period, and the Operations Peri-
od. These periods depict the three major periods
of a project that progresses from an identified
user need, through concept determination, con-
tractor participation for development, and ulti-
mately to user operation.
The "Study Period" consists of four phases. They
are the User Requirements Definition Phase
(commonly known in NASA as pre-Phase A), the
Concept Definition Phase (commonly known as
Phase A), the System Performance Definition
Phase (commonly known as Phase B), and the
Acquisition Planning Phase.
The "Acquisition Period" consists of the Source
Selection Phase and the System Development
Phase (commonly known as Phases C/D).
The "Operations Period" consists of the Deploy-
ment Phase and the Operations and Mainten-
ance Phase. It is sometimes called Phase E.
The objective of the "User Requirements De-
finition Phase" at the start of the Study Period is
to determine exactly which of the user's total
requirements will be included and satisfied by
the proposed project. Usually, user require-
ments are more comprehensive than can be
reasonably or economically incorporated into a
single project. Considerable analysis, nego-
tiation and decision making must occur to
identify the project's subset of the user's
requirements, which are then recorded in the
project's System Requirements Document and
signed off by both the user and the project
manager. In addition,executive approvals for
the project and initial project funding are
secured. The need to control requirements, of
course, is understood.
The prime objective of the "Concept Definition
Phase" is to select the preferred concept from
possible candidates, and then to develop the
budgetary "should cost" estimate and the
"should take" schedule, and then to identify and
resolve any areas of high risk. The System
Performance Specification and the Interface
Specifications are developed during the System
Performance Definition Phase so that the
selected system can be competed for the
marketplace. During the Acquisition Planning
Phase the approach to the acquisition is
developed and documented in the Acquisition
Plan, and a credible, qualified bidder's list is
prepared. If the project can be performed totally
internal to NASA, the justification for this
approach will be determined in this phase.
The objective of the "Source Selection Phase" is
to select through fair and open competition the
best value through the comprehensive,
analytical evaluation of contractor proposals.
The system concept is designed, produced,
verified and delivered during the "System
Development Phase." The events of this phase
ensure that the concept is in full com-pliance
with all contractual requirements.
The main objective of the "Deployment Phase"
is to transfer the system from the contractor's
facility to the operational location, and then to
establish full operational capability of the sys-
tem. The system is operated and evaluated in
terms of the success of the system in meeting the
original project objectives during the "Oper-
ations and Maintenance Phase."
The Technical Aspect of the Project Cycle
The Technical Aspect of the Project Cycle can be
viewed as a "V" formation within the project cy-
cle (see Figure 2, Overview of Technical Aspect
of the Project Cycle). While budget and business
events can typically be compressed and acceler-
ated, the technical events are the most signifi-
cant force in the project cycle, and ultimately
they drive the length and cost of the project.
The beginning and the end of the cycle deals
with the user's requirements and the user's sat-
isfaction, respectively. These are the highest
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Figure2 -Overview oftheTechnicalAspectofthe ProjectCycle
levels of the "V." In the center of the cycle, at
Critical Design Review (CDR), the events of the
project are at the lowest level, dealing with
hardware and software process details such as
fastening, bonding, and coding. The left side of
the "V," descending from the highest point to
the lowest point, is defined as Decomposition
and Definition. The right side of the "V", ascend-
ing to the fully operational system, is called In-
tegration and Verification. System engineering
is responsible for the technical management of
the entire "V."
Typically, the upper portion of both sides of the
"V" is managed by the government, with con-
tractor participation. The center level of the "V"
is managed by the contractor's systems engi-
neers, with design engineering participation
and government oversight. The lower portion of
the "V" is managed by the contractor's design
engineers, with oversight by the contractor's
systems engineers.
Only the core of the "V" is presented in Figure 2.
The process illustrated here is similar to the
traditional waterfall model of system
decomposition and integration. However, this
model provides improvement in the under-
standing process. Detailed hardware, software
and operational analysis is recommended at
each step in the decomposition to assess solution
feasibility and risk, and to provide necessary
data to select between various options (see
Figure 3). As the project progresses from one
step in the "V" to the next, only the decisions on
the core are put under configuration
management.
Off-core details are illustrated by the process of
requirements flowing down to successively
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lower levels,performing trade-offanalyses to
determine the best approach at each level (as
depicted in Figure 3). This progressive and
iterativeprocess isrepeated untilthe lowestlev-
el decisions have been made with valid ratio-
nale,all traceable to the originaluser require-
ments. Management of the Decomposition and
Definitionprocess demands both requirements
traceabilityand baseline configurationmanage-
ment. The management of Integrationand Ver-
ificationrequires compliance verificationand
fullaccountabilityofallspecifiedrequirements.
Systems engineering isresponsibleforthisman-
agement.
As the project proceeds through the "V," it pro-
gresses in time and maturity. The maturity is
measured by the evolving technical baseline,
which is progressively placed under formal con-
figuration control by the government project
manager.
At the beginning of the "V," the approved base-
line is the user's agreed upon requirements. At
Full Scale Development (Phase C/D contract
award), the approved baseline is the System
Performance Specification. At PDR (Prelimi-
nary Design Review), the approved baseline be-
comes the approved "Design-to" specifications.
At CDR (Critical Design Review), the approved
baseline becomes the "Build-to" documentation.
Baseline evolution and approval continues
throughout the project cycle.
Project management is the most complicated of
all management processes. It encompasses
detailed sets of interrelated activities that
involve many different specialty disciplines.
These include funding, contracting, systems
engineering, design engineering, production,
quality, procurement, systems acquisition,
systems integration, systems verification,
configuration control, subcontracting, and many
others. The interactive complexity is so great
that it is difficult for even the most experienced
team to operate proactively and efficiently
without drawing on a baseline project cycle as a
reference starting point.
While there are those who proclaim that a
defined project cycle inhibits the creativity of
project participants, just the opposite is realized.
By having defined a typical cycle that is tailored
to the project and then further expanded into the
strategic network and project plan, the project
team is not distracted by day-to-day project ac-
tivities. A defined process releases contributors
to concentrate on content, rather than process.
A defined project cycle illustrates the generic
budget, business and technical events required
to be successful. The project cycle should be
tailored to the type of project and is the skeleton
around which the strategic and tactical
approaches to the project can develop into a
logical network. By having a defined process,
the team is free to be innovative and, therefore,
more successful.
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Systems Engineering and Integration Management
for Manned Spaceflight Programs
by Owen Morris
This paper is one in a series prepared for NASA
under contract from the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory. Although the papers were commissioned by
the NASA Alumni League, which also provided
editorial services, the opinions expressed in the
paper belong solely to the author.
The development of systems engineering and
program management in NASA manned space
programs has grown in a largely uncoordinated
manner over the last 30 years; however, the
systems and practices that have been developed
form a proven pattern for successfully inte-
grating large technically complex programs
executed in several geographical locations. This
development has not been recorded in a
comprehensive manner, and much of the reason-
ing behind the decisions made is not obvious.
Although there is no generally accepted
definition of SE&I, for the purposes of this
discussion systems engineering is defined as the
interdisciplinary engineering that is necessary
to achieve efficient definition and integration of
program elements in a manner that meets the
system-level requirements. Integration is
defined as the activity necessary to develop and
document the system's technical characteristics,
including interface control requirements,
resource reporting and analysis, system verif-
ication requirements and plans, and inte-
gration of the system elements into the program
operational scenario.
This paper discusses the history of SE&I
management of the overall program archi-
tecture, organizational structure, and the
relationship of SE&I to other program
organizationalelements. A brief discussion of
the method of executing the SE&I process, a
summary of some ofthe major lessons learned,
and identificationof things that have proven
successfulare included.
History
NASA, then the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics (NACA), participation in the
management of major aerospace programs
began shortly after World War II with the
advent of the X-series research aircraft. In these
projects, essentially all of the technical
responsibility was delegated to one of the NACA
Centers. At this time, the Centers were
primarily expert in the technical areas being
explored (i.e., aerodynamics, stability, control,
and structures) but did not have experts in the
development of hardware. Accordingly, NACA
entered into agreements with the Air Force or
Navy to manage the actual development of the
aircraft, while the NACA Centers focused their
direction on the technical requirements and
performance characteristics to be demonstrated
by the aircraft. The contractor's responsibility
was similar to that for the development of any
aircraft, and the contractor usually furnished
test pilots for early demonstration flights.
With the formation of NASA and the start of
major manned space programs, it was necessary
for NASA to develop the capability to manage
complex development activities. Very little
SE&I capability existed within the functional
organizations of the NASA Centers. As a result,
SE&I expertise was developed within each of the
program offices. In particular, the Gemini pro-
gram office was set up with autonomous capabil-
ity to manage SE&I and direct the development
contractor.
With the advent of the Apollo program, SE&I
was again managed from the project offices at
the development Centers. The project offices
used specialized technical capability from the
Center functional organizations and prime con-
tractors and initiated the practice of hiring sup-
port contractors to assist in implementing SE&I.
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After the Apollo I fire, a review committee was
established to determine the cause of the fire
and recommend modifications to the program.
One of the recommendations made was that
NASA acquire a technical integration and engi-
neering support contractor to assist in accom-
plishing SE&I activity. The Washington pro-
gram office selected Boeing as the contractor
and managed the contract for this activity; how-
ever, a large portion of the manpower was locat-
ed at the development Centers. The contractor's
responsibilities included monitoring the devel-
opment and operational activities at the Cen-
ters, forming integrated assessments of the ac-
tivity, and making recommendations to the pro-
gram director for improvements. As the pro-
gram matured, the contract focus was changed,
and the contractor provided a significant num-
ber of personnel to directly support the centers
in SE&I and systems activities.
With the initiation of the Space Shuttle program
and the adoption of the lead Center concept, it
was decided to manage the Level II integration
activity, including SE&I, by providing a small
management core within the program office and
using many of the Center's functional organiza-
tions to provide technical support in a matrix
fashion. At the Johnson Space Center (JSC), the
lead person from the functional organization
was generally a branch head or an assistant di-
vision chief. Therefore, JSC had a relatively
large staff to draw from to provide the specific
technical expertise and the level of effort needed
to accomplish a given task.
The Space Station Freedom program was start-
ed using the Space Shuttle program as a model.
As the lead Center, JSC managed integration.
Later, the Level II function was moved near
Washington, D.C., under the deputy program di-
rector, and an independent contractor was
brought in to assist the integration process. The
Space Station Freedom program's management
organization is discussed in more detail in the
next section.
Figure 1- Apollo Program Organization
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Program Management Organizational
Structure
A single NASA Center largely managed early
NASA manned space flight programs, which al-
lowed for a relatively simple organizational
structure to accomplish program integration.
JSC, then called Manned Space Center (MSC),
managed both developmental and flight oper-
ational aspects of the Mercury and Gemini pro-
grams with the checkout and preflight testing
being performed by support elements at Cape
Canaveral.
The Apollo program became organizationally
more complex (see Figure 1). The spacecraft de-
velopment was managed by JSC; the launch ve-
hicle development by the Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC); the prelaunch activities by the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), by then an inde-
pendent NASA Center; and the flight operations
by JSC. In all of these programs, the responsibil-
ity for the development of the flight hardware
was delegated to the Centers, and the interfaces
between projects were intentionally kept as sim-
ple as possible. The Washington office, under di-
rection of the program director, was responsible
for overall direction of the program including
budgetary allocations, congressional relations,
and management of development issues be-
tween the project offices at the different Centers.
The actual integration activity (SE&I) was co-
ordinated by a series of panels and working
groups in which individuals from the Washing-
ton program office served as either chairperson
or members, with the program director oversee-
ing the activity. In the early programs (Mercury
and Gemini), this activity was the responsibility
of a single Center, and the Washington office
was coordinated in an informal manner, but by
the end of the Apollo program, the management
of the panel and working group activity was rel-
atively formal. In all of these programs the Cen-
ter directors took an active part and personally
felt responsible for the technical excellence of
the work performed by their Centers. This in-
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tercenter involvement was accomplished pri-
marily through the management council and
major program reviews where Center directors
personallyparticipatedin major decisions.
In part of the Apollo program, the Washington
officeretained the responsibilityfor performing
the SE&I activitywith actualwork being led by
Bellcom, a divisionof Bell Laboratories. Ulti-
mately, thisapproach was abandoned in part be-
cause much of the Center director'sresponsi-
bilitywas lost,and an adversarial relationship
between the program directorand the Center or-
ganizations developed. The execution of the
SE&I was returned tothe Centers with manage-
ment and coordination of intercenteractivities
achieved through the use of working groups,
panels,and management reviews.
At the outsetof the Space Shuttle program (see
Figure 2),the management of SE&I was chang-
ed. Some of the more important changes were:
adoption of the lead Center management con-
cept,in which one of the participatingCenters
was delegated the management of program-
levelintegrationincluding SE&I activities;the
adoption ofa configuration with functionaland
physical interfacesof much greater complexity;
and the employment of one of the major hard-
ware development contractorsas the integration
support contractor. The complex interfaces
made SE&I activityvoluminous and involved
and required the commitment of a larger per-
centage of the program resources to this activ-
ity.
The Space Station Freedom program was struc-
tured so that the interface activity between the
work packages was even more complex than
that of the Space Shuttle program. Initially, the
lead Center approach to SE&I activity was
adopted, but the implementation was not effec-
tive. As a result of recommendations made by
study groups and the committee reviewing the
Challenger accident, it was decided to transfer
the responsibility for program integration activ-
ity, including SE&I, to the deputy program di-
rector in Reston, Virginia, and to bring on a con-
Figure 3 - Space Station Freedom Program Organization
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tractor to provide program integration support
(see Figure 3). Contractors having significant
hardware development contracts were excluded
from the contract competition. The first ap-
proach was to provide detailed management of
SE&I activity by the Reston civil service person-
nel with the integration contractor providing
support in executing the activity. Additionally,
it was thought that much of the technical inte-
gration activity could be accomplished by hav-
ing the work package contractors negotiate the
definition and execution of much of the detailed
integration process directly between them-
selves. This proved ineffective, however, be-
cause there was no clear lead responsibility and
no clear way to resolve differences. As a result,
because of the complexity of the program inte-
gration and the lack of in-depth backup capabil-
ity, this management approach has not been
completely effective.
Recently, it was decided to give the integration
support contractor direct responsibility for the
integration of the program but without author-
ity to directly manage the work packages or
their contractors. In an attempt to obtain more
in-depth capability, the program director and
deputy program director decided to execute the
systems integration portion of the SE&I activity
at two of the field centers with the deputy direc-
tor for integration physically located at one of
the Centers. Since these functions were still re-
tained organizationally within the program of-
rice, they were under the control of the deputy
program director and, at the same time, had the
advantage of drawing from the technical capa-
bility residing at the Centers. Simultaneously,
the integrating contractor's personnel at the
Centers was materially increased in both re-
sponsibility and quantity.
Growing Program Complexity
One of the major factors that determines the ef-
ficiency of the integration of a program is the
methodology used in delegating the engineering
and development responsibilities to the project
offices at the field Centers. It has been found
that less complex organizational structures and
simple interfaces are extremely important to al-
low efficient management of the SE&I activi-
ties. Each of NASA's manned space programs
has been organizationally more complex than its
predecessor and has had more complex inter-
faces. In both the Mercury and Gemini pro-
grams, the flight elements were divided into two
parts, spacecraft and launch vehicle, and the
physical and functional interfaces between the
two were quite simple. The induced environ-
mental interfaces were somewhat more complex
but readily amenable to experimental and ana-
lytical determination.
The Apollo program involved a major increase
in program complexity. The spacecraft was di-
vided into two projectofficeswhile the launch
vehiclewas divided into four projectoffices.By
assigning the four launch vehicleprojectstothe
same development center (MSFC), the integra-
tionbetween launch vehicle stages could be ac-
complished at the Center level.Similarly, both
spacecraftprojectswere assigned to one Center
(JSC) for the same reason. The physical and
functionalinterfacesbetween the spacecraftand
launch vehicle,and hence between development
Centers, was relativelysimple. In a paper writ-
ten in 1971 titledWhat Made Apollo a Success,
George Low stated:
Another important design rule, which we
have not discussed as often as we should,
reads: Minimize functional interfaces be-
tween complex pieces of hardware. Examples
in Apollo include the interfaces between the
spacecraft and launch vehicle and between
the command module and the lunar module.
Only some 100 wires link the Saturn launch
vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft, and most
of these have to do with the emergency detec-
tion system. The reason that this number
could not be even smaller is twofold: redun-
dant circuits are employed, and the electrical
power always comes from the module or
stage where a function is to be performed.
For example, the closing of relays in the
launch vehicle could, in an automatic abort
mode, fire the spacecraft escape motor. But
the electrical power to do this, by design,
originates in the spacecraft batteries. The
main point is that a single man can fully un-
derstand this interface and can cope with all
the effects of a change on either side of the in-
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terface. If there had been 10 times as many
wires, it probably would have taken a hun-
dred (or a thousand?) times as many people
to handle the interface.
However, the operational complexity of the
Apollo vehicle demanded a more extensive inte-
gration activity between the Centers, and for
the first time posed the problem of accomplish-
ing detailed technical coordination between
Centers.
One of the basic tenets of the Space Shuttle pro-
gram was to have an integrated vehicle that
would recover the most expensive elements of
the system for reuse. This led to a design concept
that placed a great majority of the electronics
and major components of the main propulsion
systems in the orbiter. This design concept led to
very large increases in interface complexity be-
tween the program elements and, more impor-
tantly, between development Centers. For in-
stance, the number of electrical wires running
between the external tank and the orbiter was
more than an order of magnitude greater than
between the spacecraft and launch vehicle of
Apollo, and for the first item, major fluid sys-
tems ran across the interfaces. This represented
a formidable increase in the effort required to
successfully accomplish the SE&I activity. As
previously noted, the new program management
structure, shown in Figure 1, was adopted to ac-
commodate the increase. The accomplishment of
program level SE&I was given to a "lead Cen-
ter." The program director at headquarters was
still responsible for program budgetary control,
Congressional relations and a technical staff
sufficient to assure that the program technical
activity was being properly implemented. At
JSC, which was the lead Center for the Space
Shuttle program, a Level II program office was
established totally separate from the Level III
orbiter project office, located at the same Center.
The development of the flight hardware was
delegated to four project offices with the orbiter
office located at JSC, as mentioned above, and
the other three, the Space Shuttle main engine
office, the external tank office, and solid rocket
booster office, located at MSFC. In addition to
the hardware development project offices, a
prelaunch processing office was formed at KSC.
All of the project offices reported to the Level II
program manager for all programmatic dir-
ection except budget allocation, which was re-
tained by the program director at headquarters.
The SE&I activity was delegated to the Systems
Integration Office located within the JSC Level
II Office. The orbiter contractor, Rockwell
International, was selected to be the integration
support contractor, but to increase objectivity,
the integration activity was made a separate
exhibit to the contract and technical direction
was delegated to the Level II Systems
Integration Office. The MSFC Space Shuttle
Project Office appointed an integration manager
to manage the integration of the Marshall Space
Shuttle Projects and to serve as the primary
interface to the Level II Systems Integration
Office.
The flight hardware developmental delegation
of the Space Station Freedom program was
formulated in an even more complex manner
(see Figure 4). End-to-end developmental
responsibility for each of the major functional
systems was delegated to one of four project
offices called work package offices; the
responsibility for assembling and delivering the
flight hardware was broken down by launch
elements, again assigned to one of the work
package offices. Each of these launch elements
incorporated components of most of the
distributed systems, necessitating the transfer
of an extremely large number of hardware and
software items between work packages prior to
their delivery to the government. This resulted
in another major increase in the complexity of
the program-level SE&I process and directly
contributed to the difficulty of implementing a
satisfactory SE&I process in the Space Station
Freedom program.
SE&I Scenario
As a program develops from concept to
operational status, the characteristics of the
SE&I activity vary greatly. Early in the
program, conceptual stage SE&I is intimately
involved in defining systems that will meet the
overall program objectives and in evaluating the
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Figure 4- SpaceStation FreedomIntegration Activities
relative merits of each. This is usually
accomplished in NASA manned programs by the
civil service organizations, often in concert with
Phase A/B contracts with industry.
After the general systems specification has been
developed and a detailed evaluation of system
concepts completed, SE&I provides a lead in the
preparation of the procurement specifications
for the Phase C/D activity and is usually directly
involved in the source selection process. After
award of the Phase C/D contracts and final se-
lection of the design approach chosen for imple-
mentation, SE&I is responsible for preparing
system level technical specifications, which de-
fine the pe_ormance requirements to be satis-
fied by each of the major program elements.
SE&I then develops the system characterization
process to be used (discussed in more detail
later) and starts an initial analysis cycle. The
results of this cycle are extremely important in
verifying the validity of the system technical
specifications and providing a technical basis for
conducting the Program Requirements Review
(PRR). After completion of the PRR and
updating of the technical specifications, SE&I
starts the definition of the interface control
document tree and the initial drafts of the
documents. Another system characterization
cycle is started based on the updated specifi-
cations and the hardware/software concepts
chosen to assess the adequacy of the proposed
preliminary design approach.
By this time in the program, the ad hoc organi-
zational structure should be well in place and
functioning on a routine basis. The communica-
tion and management overview provided by this
structure of working groups, panels, and re-
views is central to accomplishing horizontal in-
tegration among the project offices and is dis-
cussed in more detail in a later section.
In preparation for the preliminary design
review (PDR), SE&I defines the minimum
content required in the PDR data packages and
is responsible for preparing system-level
documents supporting the Integrated System
PDR. During the PDR process, SE&I represen-
tatives participate in the project-level reviews
with particular emphasis on the compliance of
the project to the system-level requirements.
During the integrated system PDR, emphasis is
placed on assuring that the preliminary designs
meet the operational requirements of the
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program. The SE&I organization is intimately
involved with the evaluation and dispositionof
review item discrepancies (RIDS) that are
submitted during the review.
As a result of the PDR process, changes to the
requirements and modifications to the prelimi-
nary design of the elements are incorporated. A
new characterization cycle is then initiated to
evaluate the compatibility between the modified
requirements and proposed system capabilities.
At this time, the drafts of the interface control
documents are expanded and quantitative detail
added to assure that they are mature enough to
become baseline requirements in the program.
This maturation process inevitably adds a sig-
nificant number of changes to the baseline.
In a similar manner, the verification plans of
the elements and the integrated system are
refined and baselined. The responsibility for
executing the test and analysis required by the
integrated system verification plan is delegated
to appropriate organizations who then prepare
detailed plans for accomplishing the assigned
portions of the verification.
Detailed mission operational scenarios and
timelines are prepared by the operations or-
ganizations, and the operations and SE&I
organizations jointly conduct an analysis of the
system capabilities to support the scenarios.
Concurrently, the acceptance test and prelaunch
operations requirements and plans are prepared
and delegated for execution.
In preparation for the critical design review
(CDR), another system characterization cycle is
performed based upon the detailed design of the
elements. This cycle typically uses mature
models to synthesize the hardware and software
systems and also incorporates the results of tests
performed to that time. SE&I participates in the
conduct of the CDR in a manner similar to that
of the PDR. After completion of the CDR, the
system requirements and design changes
resulting from the CDR are incorporated into
the documentation, and another complete or
partial system characterization cycle is
performed to validate the decisions made during
CDR.
After CDR, the primary activity of the SE&I or-
ganization is to analyze test results and conduct
analysis to verify the capability of the system
that is being manufactured. Particular empha-
sis is given to verifying the interface character-
istics of the elements as defined by the interface
control documents. This activity directly sup-
ports the preparation for the design certification
review (DCR) and provides interface informa-
tion necessary to allow acceptance of the system
hardware and software by the government.
The DCR is conducted similar to the PDR and
CDR but addresses the as-built hardware and
software. Successful completion of the DCR
certifies the acceptability of the as-built ele-
ments and the ability to be integrated into an
overall system that will satisfy the initial
program operations requirements. Final
operational certification of the system is
obtained by a combination of the DCR process
and analysis of information obtained during
early flight operation of the system.
SE&I organization participation throughout the
program development cycle provides them a
unique capability to support operational plan-
ning and real time operations. SE&I is the
repository of corporate knowledge of the details
of the system capability, which is vital to the
effective and efficient operation of the system.
Relationship of SE&I to Other Program
Functions
To effectively accomplish the SE&I task, the
SE&I management organization must maintain
good communications and obtain the support of
other program office organizations. Some of the
more important interactions are discussed be-
low.
Configuration Management
The interaction between SE&I and config-
uration management is particularly strong. As
the developers and keepers of the systems
specifications, SE&I has an interface with the
configuration management function that is
extremely active throughout the life of the
program. The SE&I office recommends the
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baseliningofthe technical requirementsasthey
becomesufficiently mature and then servesas
the officeof primary responsibility for defining
andevaluating mostof the proposedchangesto
this baseline. The SE&I office, after proper
coordination throughout the integration
function, also recommends the processing of
non-controversialchangesoutsideof the formal
controlboardmeetings,whereappropriate.This
results in significantly reducing the board's
workload and conservesthe time of the key
managers who are members of the Change
ControlBoard.Significant issuesare referredto
the board, and the SE&I office presents its
analysis of the issues involved and makes
appropriaterecommendations.
Program Control
SE&I supports the program control function in
the development of program schedules and bud-
gets. The key to making this support effective is
the use of SE&I logic networks and estimates of
the manpower required to accomplish activities.
Because of its interdisciplinary nature, SE&I
can assist in planning activities in many
program areas.
Early in the program, SE&I helps define the
content and schedule milestones for each of the
projects so the coherent development of project-
level schedules and cost estimates can be achiev-
ed. In addition to supporting program control,
SE&I provides program control with the engin-
eering master schedules (EMS) and associated
budget estimates for incorporation in the overall
schedule and budget system. SE&I also works
with program control in the planning of major
program reviews, provides technical leadership
during the conduct of the reviews, and frequent-
ly chairs the screening groups and preboards.
Operations
In all of the NASA manned space programs to
date, the SE&I function has been managed in a
different organization from the operations defi-
nition and planning function. Although this is
undoubtedly the best choice in the later phases
of the program, it may result in a less thorough
incorporation of operational requirements in the
systems specifications and other SE&I products
early in the program. It may be desirable to con-
sider combining the management of SE&I and
operations in the same office early in the pro-
gram and then separating them at a later time,
such as completion of the predesign review
(PDR). The stated reason for separating the
functions in the past has been that they serve as
a check-in-balance on each other; however; this
causes disconnects in the detailed interfaces be-
tween the two functions.
SR&QA
The interactions between SE&I and the System
Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA)
functions depends on how the delegation of
responsibility for executing the program is
approached. If a large part of the SR&QA
activity is accomplished within the SR&QA or-
ganization, then the interface with SE&I is
mostly that of using SE&I as a reservoir of
information or to perform specific tasks as
requested by SR&QA. However, if the SR&QA
office is responsible for setting the requirements
for the SR&QA activities and evaluating the
outcome while other organizations such as SE&I
are delegated the responsibility for executing
the work, then the interface becomes one of
SR&QA defining and obtaining baseline
approval of task requirements, monitoring
execution of the task by SE&I, and evaluating
the results to assure satisfactory achievement.
The former mode of operation was exemplified
during early portions of the Apollo program,
where the SR&QA activities were largely
accomplished within the SR&QA office using
basic engineering information obtained from
SE&I and other program organizational offices.
Later in the Apollo program, the second mode of
operation was adopted, in which engineering
offices, primarily SE&I, actually performed the
work and made a first-level analysis prior to
formally transmitting the results to SR&QA for
authentication. This latter mode of operation
was felt to be more effective primarily because
problems and discrepancies were often
discovered by the originating engineering office
and corrected even before the task was
completed.
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SE&I Execution
Many techniques have been developed in past
NASA manned programs that have proven ef-
fective and have become an integral part of im-
plementing SE&I activities. The following para-
graphs describe some of the more important
techniques to assist those planning and imple-
menting new programs.
Importance of SE&I Early in a Program
Comprehensive SE&I support is crucial in the
early stages of complex programs to assist in
determining the architecture to be used in
delegating project responsibility. This is
accomplished by dividing the program into the
next lower level of management, the project
offices. The primary outputs are comprehensive
and clear program requirement specifications,
identification of major programmatic interfaces,
development of the ad hoc SE&I management
structure, definition of operating concepts, and
preparation of initial specifications for the
hardware to be delegated to each project office.
The SE&I organization is responsible for
managing technical integration both vertically
between different levels of the management or-
ganizational structure and horizontally across
the organizations at each level. To efficiently
achieve both dimensions of integration, it is nec-
essary to develop logic diagrams of the major
SE&I activities to be accomplished by each of
the organizational elements and then to deter-
mine the interrelationships between them. By
developing these diagrams and playing them
against different organizational structures, it is
possible to evaluate the proposed organizations
in simple terms and easily define the interac-
tions between the organizational elements, thus
helping to choose the most efficient manage-
ment structure. The importance of the logic dia-
grams will be discussed later.
Development and Use of Ad hoc
Integration Structure
To manage the definition and implementation of
the SE&I activities in manned space programs,
NASA has developed an effective ad hoc organ-
izational structure. The structure consists of a
series of reviews, panels, and working groups
that address the definition and management of
integration functions throughout the program.
Each of these organizations has membership re-
presenting all of the organizations interested in
the particular integration function being man-
aged. In the Space Station Freedom program,
the working group structure is formed by techni-
cal disciplines and distributed systems, such as
Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C), Ro-
botics, and Loads and Dynamics. The panels are
formed to address specific programmatic man-
agement areas (i.e., assembly requirements and
stage definition, system design integration, and
element design integration) that span a number
of organizations. The reviews are formed to ad-
dress relatively broad program areas as shown
in Figure 5.
Each of these organizations is responsible for de-
veloping the integration plan in its area of re-
sponsibility, monitoring the execution of the
tasks, identifying problem areas, and either re-
Figure 5 - Station Technical Review Structure 1990
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solving them or submitting them to the overall
program management structure for resolution.
Many benefits result from the face-to-face meet-
ings and interchange of information among
peers in these organizations. Although these or-
ganizations by their nature do not perform
work, the members, by working back through
their functional organizations, greatly influence
the work being accomplished in their particular
areas of expertise. As rapport is developed be-
tween members, many potential problems and
issues are identified and resolved without the
need for referral to the formal management de-
cision channels. In addition, the quality of the
work materially improves. This ad hoc organiza-
tional structure also provides obvious places for
program elements to present issues of any given
nature for deliberation and resolution. All of the
panels and working groups support each of the
reviews as needed and submit their open issues
to the most appropriate review for resolution.
The reviews address broad issues and serve as a
communication channel between the panels and
working groups. Since the reviews are broad
and cover all of the panels and working groups,
they provide an excellent way to assess and rec-
ommend activities that address the interdisci-
plinary aspects of the program.
Chairpeople of the panels and working groups
are the best qualified individuals available in
the particular discipline, and only secondary
consideration is given to selecting a person from
a specific organizational element. As a result of
their recognized stature, the chairpeople provide
leadership, which makes their recommenda-
tions and decisions more readily acceptable. The
panels and working groups also request outside
expertise when needed; such outside inputs are
filtered by the panels and working groups prior
to making a recommendation to the reviews or
other management organizations.
Internal vs. Matrix SE&I Staffing
As already noted, SE&I activity was staffed and
accomplished in different ways in the different
NASA manned programs. At times, in the early
manned space programs, the personnel required
to accomplish the SE&I activity were assigned
directly to the program and project offices. At
other times, during the Apollo and Shuttle
programs, the program office had only the
people necessary to manage the SE&I activity,
and most of the work was accomplished by
technical experts assigned from the Center's
functional organizations in a matrix fashion.
Although each had its advantages and disad-
vantages, the matrix approach in general ap-
pears to have had more advantages, one of the
most important being that the manpower can be
increased or decreased as needed by pulling
support from the matrix organizations without
requiring reassignment of the people involved.
The primary disadvantage is that the leader of a
particular area does not report functionally to
the program or project office; therefore, the line
of direction is not as strong, a factor that is in-
versely proportional to the working relationship
between the organizations.
In the Space Shuttle program, this relationship
and the matrix approach worked well. In other
programs, the relationship was not as good and
direction through the matrix was less effective.
On occasion, program management appointed
all panel and working group chairpeople from
the program office staff, giving less regard to the
personal qualifications of the individuals. This
has led to a marked decrease in the stature of
the ad hoc structure, which resulted in a lack of
support from the functional organizations and a
decrease in the quality of the integration activ-
ity and products. As in many areas of SE&I, ef-
fective implementation relies heavily on the
quality of the leadership and the maintenance of
free and open communications between the or-
ganizations involved.
Logic Networks
As the NASA manned space programs have
become increasingly complex, it has become
difficult to define the specific content and tasks
needed to accomplish the SE&I function.
Central to the development of a comprehensive
SE&I plan is the development of detailed logic
networks. These networks form the basis for
planning, executing and evaluating SE&I
activities.
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As used in the Space Shuttle program, these
logic networks covered all of the SE&I activities
that had to be accomplished by all elements of
the program organization. Thus, these networks
were able to interrelate SE&I activities both
vertically and horizontally throughout the pro-
gram management structure. The basic sum-
mary logic networks were developed for the en-
tire program duration to identify all major ac-
tivities required as a function of time and were
instrumental in developing cost and manpower
forecasts for the entire duration of the program.
Detailed logic networks were then prepared in
the Shuttle program for 12 months, identifying
in greater detail the specific activities to be ac-
complished by each organizational element dur-
ing that period. The networks were revised ev-
ery six months to extend the detail planning ho-
rizon, and in addition, the summary networks
were reviewed and modified as needed on an an-
nual basis. The logic networks were a primary
input to the development of the engineering
master schedules discussed next.
Engineering Master Schedules (EMS) and
Associated Dictionary
The activities identified in the SE&I integration
logic networks were then assigned to specific
organizations for execution and presented as a
schedule for each organization involved. By
using a numbering system for the activities, a
correlation between the logic network and the
schedule could be easily provided. Preparation
of the schedules allowed cost and manpower
estimates to be prepared for each organization
and provided an excellent means of updating
and managing the activities in real time.
Associated with the engineering master
schedule (EMS), a dictionary was prepared with
an entry for each activity. Each entry identified
all input information required to allow the
accomplishment of the activity; described the
contents of the products; and identified the pri-
mary user of each product, the scheduled
completion date, and the person responsible for
preparing the product. The EMS and the
dictionary were the primary tools for defining
and communicating SE&I activities throughout
the entire program structure.
As would be expected, the basic content of the
EMS changes character over the life of the
program and accordingly requires a varying mix
of technical capabilities as a function of time.
Early in the program, the activities are
primarily of a design nature and involve a large
number of trade studies and the development of
synthesis tools to be used in evaluating the
capabilities of the proposed design. As the
program matures and the design solidifies, the
activities become more involved with exercising
the system models, conducting tests, and ana-
lyzing data. As the flight phase approaches, the
activities are predominated by operational
considerations, including the development of
operational data books, mission requirements,
certification of system readiness, and support of
mission planning and real time mission
operations.
System Characterization Process
A major SE&I activity throughout the program
life span is the assessment of the capability of
the system to meet specified requirements. In
the NASA manned space program, this has been
accomplished primarily by synthesizing the ve-
hicle characterizations in the form of either
models or simulations and then developing de-
tailed performance characterizations by exercis-
ing the models against selected mission time-
lines and significant mission events.
The methodology used in performing the system
synthesis is central to the development of the
logic networks and schedules described earlier.
An examination of the system usually reveals
scenarios useful in conducting the overall sys-
tem evaluation, and after selecting the most de-
sirable scenario, it is used to form the nucleus of
the overall SE&I logic. In the Space Shuttle pro-
gram, the scenario chosen was (1) developing
the necessary models and simulations, (2) deter-
mining the structural modal characteristics, (3)
determining the loads on each of the system ele-
ments, and (4) performing stress analysis of the
system when subjected to these loads. Using this
scenario it was relatively easy to define and in-
terrelate the SE&I activities of other disciplines,
such as GN&C, propulsion, and thermal, among
others. After definition of all of the required ac-
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the models to be used, the mission events to be
analyzed, and a definition of the configuration to
be used. The sequence described above formed
an analysis cycle of a specific configuration sub-
jected to specific operational requirements and,
in the Shuttle program, was termed an integrat-
ed vehicle baseline characterization cycle
(IVBC). In this article, the capability assess-
ment is referred to as a system characterization
cycle. As previously described in the SE&I sce-
nario, several characterization cycles are needed
during the life of the program. As the program
matures, the cycles are characterized by having
additional synthesis detail, more definitive con-
figuration information, and better operational
information.
At the completion of each of the characterization
cycles, system deficiencies are identified and
modifications to either the system specifications
or the requirements are made. For program
management purposes, it is usually convenient
to schedule the completion of one of the
characterization cycles to occur just prior to each
of the major program level review milestones.
Program Reviews
SE&I has a large input to each of the program-
level reviews, such as system requirements
review, predesign review, critical design review,
design certification review, and flight readiness
reviews. As mentioned above, completion of one
of the system characterization cycles is an
excellent indicator of whether the system design
meets the specified requirements, and the
engineering master schedule gives a graphic
representation of the integration progress being
achieved. Reports produced by the SE&I
activitymsuch as resource allocation status and
margins interface control document status,
design reference mission maturity, and system
operational data booksmgive a good indication
of the maturity of the element participation in
the system-level SE&I process.
Design Reference Missions (DRM)
Most of the manned space programs had to be
capable of performing a relatively large number
of diverse missions, and the specifications are
written in a manner to provide hardware and
software systems and elements that are flexible
enough to satisfy all of the missions. For analyt-
ical purposes, however, it is convenient to define
and adopt one or more design reference missions
(DRMs) that stress all of the system's capabil-
ities to a significant extent. The DRMs are used
as the primary mission requirements in the sys-
tem characterization cycles, and in evaluating
the ability to meet performance specifications.
In addition to evaluating the baselined configu-
ration against the DRMs, other specification re-
quirements are evaluated by the accomplish-
ment of specific analyses or tests as necessary.
The DRMs also allow the user community to
evaluate whether the system is capable of meet-
ing specific user needs and whether these needs
are specifically in the system specifications. The
DRM is also used by mission planners to deter-
mine the system's capability of performing any
specific mission under consideration.
Verification
Verification plays a major role in program
planning and in the ultimate cost of the system.
Most of the verification is delegated to projects;
however, SE&I is responsible for identifying
overall verification requirements and specifical-
ly, identifying system-level verification test and
simulations, which frequently require
specialized facilities and significant amounts of
system hardware and software. These system-
level verification tests are frequently both
complex and expensive, and planning for them
needs to be started very early in the program.
The system-level verification network is de-
veloped as an integral part of the program SE&I
logic networks and baselined early in the
program.
Final verification of some system requirements
can only be accomplished in the real flight envi-
ronment, and these are demonstrated in early
operations before final certification of system
operational capability is accomplished. It is also
important to integrate the system-level verifica-
tion planning and the operations planning to
gain the maximum possible synergy between
system verification and operational training.
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In the mannedspaceprograms,all of the major
system-levelverification tests were assignedto
program or functional organizational elements
other than SE&! for implementation.This helps
assure that the managementof SE&I can re-
main objectivein the evaluation of overall certi-
fication adequacy.
DCR Process
One of the more significant activities of SE&I is
its role in the design certification of the system
prior to the start of the flight operations and
then again later, prior to committing the system
to operating throughout the entire design enve-
lope. SE&I is instrumental in setting the overall
requirements for the DCR and is directly re-
sponsible for the system-level portion of the re-
view. This process uses synthesis of the as-built
vehicle hardware and software capabilities and
results of tests and analysis. The results of the
design certification process also form the basis
for the system operational data books that are
used in planning and conducting the operational
phase of the program. The DCR requires that all
system requirements be evaluated against all of
the as-built system capabilities, and where pos-
sible, the system margins are quantified to as-
sist the operations organization in planning and
conducting flight operations.
ICD Development
As the program management organizational
structure and the delegation of the responsibil-
ity for developing hardware and software are
made, it is necessary to start the development of
the interface control document (ICD) tree, which
identifies each required ICD and the content to
be presented. As previously noted, the division
of program activities to minimize the number
and complexity of interfaces has a strong influ-
ence on the overall program cost and the ability
of the program to meet schedules. The early de-
velopment of strawman ICD trees can greatly
assist in optimizing the overall program man-
agement structure.
As the program progresses and the system con-
figuration becomes better defined, the content of
each ICD is developed in more detail and ICD
working groups are formed to quantify the envi-
ronmental, physical, functional, and operational
characteristics in detail. In most of the manned
programs, the ICDs have been baselined at a rel-
atively early point in the program and have usu-
ally contained a large number of TBDs (to be de-
termined). After baselining the ICDs, working
groups then continue their work to arrive at spe-
cific values for each of the TBDs and to contin-
ually assess the adequacy of the ICDs as the de-
sign matures.
The ICDs are primary documents at each pro-
gram review and provide a basis for evaluating
the adequacy of the items being reviewed to sat-
isfactorily function as part of the total system.
Program Management Organizational
Structure
The efficiency of program management is
greatly influenced by the organizational struc-
ture selected. Organizational structures that are
compact and simple are essential to promote
effective program management. Compactness is
measured vertically by the number of levels of
the program management organization and hor-
izontally by the number of organizations at each
level. Each organizational element added sig-
nificantly increases the manpower and costs of
achieving program integration, including SE&I.
If each organizational element must interface
with all others in the program, the number of
interfaces increases rapidly as organizations are
added. Adding management levels increases the
complexity for delegating the execution of the
program. This factor was evident to the
Augustine Commission in their recent summary
report The Future of the U.S. Space Program, in
which they recommended that "multicenter
projects be avoided wherever possible, but when
this is not practical, a strong and independent
project office reporting to headquarters be
established near the Center having the
principal share of the work for that project; and
that this project office have a systems en-
gineering staff and full budget authority."
In addition to keeping the management struc-
ture compact, it is also very important to select
an
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an architecture that divides the program into
project offices so that the interfaces between
projectsare as simple as possibleand that the
delegation is all encompassing.In so far as
possible, all of the deliverable hardware
assigned to a given project should be the
responsibility of that project to design and
manufacture. In all of the manned programs
prior to the Space Station, there was little
transfer of hardware and software between
projects with one exception, that being the
development flight instrumentation in the
Apolloprogram.
Early in the Apollo program, a decision was
madeto establisha civil serviceproject officeto
develop,procure and deliver the specialized
development flight instrumentation to the
prime spacecraftcontractorsfor installation and
integration in the early spacecraft.Coordination
of thevery largevolumeof interfaceinformation
required the developmentand maintenance of
the complex bilateral schedules and support
required.
The complexity of providing support after the
transfer of instrumentation was a significant
management problem throughout the entire
time that the development flight instrument
wasused.In view ofthe extremely largenumber
of hardware and software items that must be
passed between work packages, it will be
difficult for the SpaceStation Freedomprogram
to develop,coordinate,and maintain all of the
interfaceinformation required.
Objectivity in Management
To promote objectivity in managing SE&I, one
of the basic ground rules in the Space Shuttle
program was that the SE&I function would not
be responsible for the development of any flight
hardware or software products; thus they had no
conflicting pressure to make their development
job easier at the expense of another
organization. It was found that any bias, either
perceived or real, immediately brings the
objectivity of management into question and
rapidly destroys the confidence between
organizational elements.
Need for Good Communication
The nature of SE&I is such that most of the
program elements and many other agency
organizations are involved in the execution of
SE&I tasks. To facilitate accomplishment of the
work, the importance of free and open
communication cannot be overly stressed. One
of the ways of accomplishing this is "to live in a
glass house." All decisions and, of equal
importance, the logic behind those decisions
must be communicated to all parties involved if
they are to understand their role and how it fits
into the overall picture. All parties must feel
that their inputs are included in the decision-
making process.
This openness, and the accompanying feeling of
vulnerability, is not welcomed and requires
faith and confidence between the organizations
involved. The fact that mistakes will be made
must be accepted, and all organizations involved
must constructively assist in correcting them.
Frequent open meetings of the ad hoc
organizational elements described above have
proven to be an effective tool in developing
rapport between peers and communicating
information and decisions throughout the
program structure. As noted earlier, however,
such meetings become increasingly time-
consuming and expensive as the complexity of
the organizational structure is increased.
Importance of Margins
At the time programs are initiated, they are fre-
quently sold on the basis of optimistic estimates
of performance capability, cost, and schedules.
This often results in reducing margins to low
levels at program initiation and solving early
program costs and schedule problems by reduc-
ing weight, power, and other resource margins.
As a consequence, margins are reduced to zero
or negative values early in the program, making
it necessary to modify the program to either re-
duce requirements or introduce program
changes that will re-establish positive margins.
The recovery of the margin inevitably leads to
significantly higher ultimate program costs in
both dollars and days. Minimum life cycle costs
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are achieved by holding relatively large mar-
gins early in the program and then allowing
them to be expended at a prudent rate during
the program life cycle.
Things That Have Worked Well
In the management of the manned space pro-
grams' SE&I activities, several approaches have
been particularly successful. Some of the more
important, briefly summarized below, have been
discussed previously in the paper but are re-
addressed here because of their assistance in the
management of SE&I.
Ad hoc Organizations
The use of ad hoc organizations to coordinate
SE&I activitieshas proven tobe a valuable tool.
The effectivenessof SE&I depends heavily on
good communications between organizations
and the assurance that a common approach to
the implementation of SE&I is being taken by
all organizational elements. This is difficultto
accomplish using the normal program officeor-
ganizations because they cannot directly ad-
dress interorganizationalcommunications and
have difficultyin managing acrossorganization-
allines.The ad hoc organizationalstructure,on
the other hand, is made up of specialistsfrom
each of the affectedorganizations,and their ac-
tivitiesdirectly promote interorganizational
communications. Using this technique, techni-
calpeers can plan and monitor the execution of
specificSE&I activities.When a resolutioncan-
not be reached within the ad hoc organizational
structure,the issue isreferredtothe proper pro-
gram management office.
Common Organizational Structure Within
the Program and Project Offices
During the Apollo program, the program direc-
tor decided to have all of the program manage-
ment offices at both Level II and Level III adopt
a standard organizational structure. Five offices
reported to the program manager and to each
project manager. This technique assured that
the work breakdown structure was similar for
all offices, that direct counterparts could be
identified in each of the offices, and that budget
allocations flowed down in a uniform and pre-
dictable manner. All of these features resulted
in less cross-linking between organizations and
made the required program management activ-
ity more rational and predictable. Although the
specific office structure chosen would be differ-
ent for each program, the concept of having uni-
formity between the Level II and Level III man-
agement offices should be considered for future
programs.
System Characterization Cycles
Constructing the SE&I plan and identifying the
required tasks is a very complex undertaking in
large programs, and as previously described, it
is best to meet the specified requirements.
Analysis of the results reveals deficiencies and
allows modifications to either the requirements
or the system design to be identified, thus
assuring an adequate margin of performance.
Building on this core analysis cycle, it is
relatively easy to plan the other SE&I tasks
around it in a consistent manner, providing a
complete characterization of the system capa-
bility.
Matrix Management Organizational
Approach
The concept of staffing the program
management office with a small number of
people who serve as managers only and then
augmenting their capability with personnel
drawn from other Center organizations in a
matrix fashion has significant advantages.
Personnel can be brought in from the
organizations only when they are actually
needed, and the makeup of the technical
capability can be changed as a function of time
to satisfy programmatic needs. The quantity can
be augmented to meet program needs, i.e., major
program reviews; the personnel involved can be
assured of a career path in their parent
organizations; and the individuals involved can
continually replenish their expertise by partici-
pating in the R&D activities in their parent
organizations.
This mode of operation has been quite successful
and has demonstrated several additional
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attributes such as reducing friction and unde-
sired competition between the program office
and Center functional organizations, improving
technical communications across programs be-
ing implemented simultaneously, and provid-
ing an efficient way of phasing the development
program into an operational role. It is notewor-
thy that the assignment of program-level SE&I
to a lead center, coupled with the execution of
this assignment using Center functional organi-
zations in a matrix fashion, allowed the program
to take advantage of both the quality and quan-
tity of technical expertise available throughout
the Center.
Use of a Prime Development Contractor
to Provide SE&I Support
In the Space Shuttle program, the SE&I support
contractor was also the prime contractor for de-
velopment of the Space Shuttle orbiter. Al-
though there was considerable concern about
the ability of the contractor to maintain objec-
tivity in supporting SE&I, this concern was re-
duced to an acceptable level by separating the
direction channels of the development and inte-
gration activity both within NASA and within
the contractor's organization. The support con-
tract was also set up with an award fee structure
in which SE&I was responsible for providing in-
puts for the SE&I activities. There were many
advantages to having this arrangement:
a)
b)
c)
d)
The integration personnel were familiar
with one of the major program elements
and did not need to become familiar with
that element or the general program
structure.
Expert technical specialists could be
made available for both activities as
needed.
Many of the synthesis tools required by
both activities were similar, and fre-
quently one model could be used for both
purposes with only minor modifications.
Uniformity in approach assured ease of
comparison of results from both project
and program level activities.
Summary
The management of SE&I in NASA's manned
space programs has developed over the last 30
years to integrate complex programs
satisfactorily. Some of the approaches and
techniques described in this paper may be
helpful in integrating future programs. Careful
consideration of the organizational structure
and systems architecture at the start of the
program will largely determine the level of
effort required to accomplish the SE&I activity.
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Shared Experiences from NASA
Programs and Projects: 1975
by Frank Hoban
This paper summarizes the lessons learned from
two workshops held at the National Academy of
Sciences in 1975. The workshops were sponsored
by NASA in conjunction with the National
Academy of Engineering. Vince Johnson, former
deputy administrator of the Office of Space Sci-
ence and Applications, chaired the sessions. The
National Academy of Engineering was repre-
sented by retired NASA executives Robert Gil-
ruth and Abe Silverstein, retired USAF General
King, and Sid Metsger of COMSAT.
The first workshop was held on February 24 and
25, 1975. The second workshop was held on June
3-4, 1975. Again, the National Academy of Sci-
ences hosted the session. In order to provide more
time for discussion, the number of projects to be
covered was reduced from nine to six.
Orbiting Solar Observatory
Goddard Space Flight Center
Robert Pickard, Manager
The first project discussed was the Orbiting
Solar Observatory-I (OSO-I). The OSO Project,
dating back to 1959, consisted of a series of
seven satellites prior to OSO-I. Ball Brothers
had built all previous spacecraft; however, due
to major changes, the I, J, and K spacecraft were
competed, with the Hughes Aircraft Company
the winner.
The primary objective of the OSO-I mission was
to investigate the lower corona of the sun, the
chromosphere, and the interface in the ultravio-
let spectral region, to better understand the
transport of energy from the photosphere into
the corona. The secondary objective was to study
solar X-rays and Earth-Sun relationships and
the background component of cosmic X-rays.
OSO-I consisted of one mission, using a 2,340-
pound spacecraft with a corresponding
payload of 827 pounds, carrying eight experi-
ments. Orbital altitude was to be 320 miles cir-
cular at 33 ° inclination. Delta was the launch
vehicle.
Prior to OSO-7, the costs of all previous space-
craft in the series were well below the $20 mil-
lion level. OSO-7, the most expensive spacecraft
of the series cost approximately $33 million;
however, OSO-I costs were estimated at $58 mil-
lion because of the complexity of the spacecraft
and greater pointing accuracies. Spacecraft
weights ranged from approximately 600 pounds
for OSO 1-6 to 1098 pounds for OSO-7 and 2,340
pounds for OSO-I.
The project manager identified the following
cost drivers:
• Control system complexity and precision.
• Stored command processor.
• Development of special integrated circuits.
Inability of Government to maintain fun-
ding when needed.
• Experimenters building their hardware.
Elements of cost control exercised by the project
were:
• Freezing the design.
• Descoping.
Establishing cost ceilings on experiments
and spacecraft.
Use of financial management reporting on
major contracts.
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• Weekly manpower tracking at spacecraft-
contractor.
• Frequent reviews with the contractor.
Recommendations:
(1) Use standard components and subsystems.
(2) Build experimenters' hardware to their
specifications.
(3) Establishadequate funding contingencies.
(4) Freeze designs early and do not over-
design.
(5) Make subsystem engineers fullyresponsi-
bleforcost,schedule,and performance.
(6) Believe the costmodel, not the proposal.
Orbiting Solar Observatories advanced our
understanding of the Sun's structure and be-
havior, thus indicating the physical processes
by which the Sun influences the Earth. This
early NASA project was directed by the Phys-
ics and Astronomy program division.
Small Astronomy Satellite Project
Goddard Space Flight Center
Marjorie Townsend, Manager
The Small Astronomy Satellite (SAS) project
consisted of three spacecraft: SAS-1, launched
December 1970; SAS-2, launched November
1972; and SAS-3, launched May 1975. The phi-
losophy of the SAS program was to build a basic
spacecraft and attach an experiment to it. The
SAS-3 mission objective was to survey the celes-
tial sphere for sources radiating in the X-ray,
gamma-ray, ultraviolet, and other spectral re-
gions, both inside and outside of our galaxy. The
spacecraft weighed approximately 262 pounds
with a 169-pound experiment package. The orbit
was a 300-mile circular equatorial. The launch
vehicle was a Scout.
The main elements of SAS management were:
Management is not by committee--one
leader makes final decisions.
Close teamwork by a small project team of
high quality.
• Conservative design concepts.
• Control of workforce.
• Parallel design on critical items.
• Careful selection of parts and materials.
• Good communications with contractors.
• Selective testing program to minimize cost.
• Ability to predict problems.
• Good schedule control.
Recommendations for future projects:
(1) Start experiment development before
spacecraft development.
(2) Buy items requiring long lead times early.
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Implement configuration management
after design phase; i.e., control changes.
Have good business people on the project to
help control costs and predict overruns.
Work closely with contractor.
Use existing design where practicable, but
don't force-fit an old design.
HIGH ENERGY
ASTIIONOMYOB$ERVATORY
HEAO-C
1979
1978
HEAO-A
1977
HEAO Experiment Package
Goddard Space Flight Center
Ronald Browning, Manager
The next project discussed was the HEAO Ex-
periment Package. The Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) was responsible for the manage-
ment of the HEAO Project; however, the God-
dard Space Flight Center (GSFC) provided two
scientific experiments, a cosmic X-ray and a sol-
id state spectrometer that were built in-house.
The GSFC project office provided management
of the hardware development and was the single
point of contact with MSFC for all matters relat-
ed to GSFC's HEAO experiments. The goals for
the project office were to accomplish the pro-
gram on schedule and within cost, incorporating
maximum hardware commonality between ex-
periments, and eliminating unnecessary redun-
dancies in the design of each experiment.
Elements of management of the experiment
package were:
• Development of experiments consistent
with established GSFC in-house mode and
acceptable to MSFC.
• Response to MSFC requirements.
• Coordination of project requirements.
• Configuration management.
• Systems engineering and design.
• Systems integration.
• Systems tests.
• Scheduling.
• Financial planning and monitoring.
Recommendations:
(1) Establish necessary resources early to meet
other Center requirements.
(2) Thoroughly review experiments prior to
Headquarters submission.
(3) Have better defined statements of work and
specifications.
(4) Establish understanding at the begin-ning
between Centers as to how the project will
be managed and controlled.
(5) Keep spacecraft development more in par-
allel with experiment development, rather
than one year behind.
Air Density/Hawkeye Project
Langley Research Center
Claude Coffee, Manager
The Hawkeye/Neutral Point Explorer Project
was a 68-pound Scout-launched spacecraft built
by the University of Iowa. The mission objec-
tives were to study the topology of the magnetic
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field at large radial distances over the Earth's
North Polar Cap and the interaction of the solar
winds with the geomagnetic field.
The University of Iowa was given total responsi-
bility for project implementation with overall
management responsibility at Langley. The uni-
versity did an excellent job; the project came in
ahead of schedule and under cost. Ball Brothers
provided engineering support to the university.
Unique features of this project included:
A one-year Phase B study effort prior to
project approval.
An understanding with the university that
funds were extremely tight, and overrun
would not be funded by NASA.
D The university's use of contracted engineer-
ing services in areas in which the universi-
ty had no expertise, and to augment key
project technical personnel.
Desire of principal investigators to launch
at the optimum time (April through June).
The Dual Air Density Explorer Project (DAD)
consisted of two satellites to be launched into co-
planar polar orbits by a single Scout launch ve-
hicle. The two satellites were a .76ram diameter
spun aluminum sphere and a 3.66m diameter
aluminum/mylar inflatable sphere. Each sphere
contained a mass spectrometer furnished by the
University of Minnesota.
The objective of the DAD mission was to study
the vertical structure of the density, composi-
tion, and temperatures of the upper atmosphere.
The two spheres were the instruments for infer-
ring the atmospheric density, while the mass
spectrometers measured the atmospheric com-
position. The molecular temperature was in-
ferred by the change in vertical composition.
Project cost drivers identified were:
Cost limitations resulted in an l 1-month
slip in schedule. The greatest impact was
in-house manpower, resulting in increased
institutional management charges.
Institutional management system was
Center-controlled with methodology chang-
ing from year to year.
Project management must be critically
aware of manpower loadings to hold down
the institutional management changes.
Problem solving by increasing in-house
manpower tends to impact total project
costs.
Principal investigator did not establish
firm cost estimates for data reduction and
analysis.
Problems encountered were:
Lack of early engineering support because
of other in-house flight projects.
Viking problems that impacted project
manpower at various times.
Inflation of sphere, coupled with the
problems of procuring high-quality
aluminum/mylar laminates materials for
the inflatable satellite.
Recommendations:
(1) Extensive Phase B type studies should be
performed for both the in-house and con-
tracted effort. This means both manpower
and funds availability.
(2) Develop "baseline" design specifications
and interfaces early.
(3) Use fixed-price subcontracts.
(4) Be cost conscious and impress this on con-
tractors.
(5) Avoid research and development after the
project starts.
(6) Establish a realistic schedule.
(7) Develop a good relationship between
project/contractor teams.
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The Hawkeye Spacecraft is shown on the spin
table during final systems tests before mating
to the first five-stage version of the Scout rock-
et. Hawheye-1 was launched June 3, 1974 to
investigate the interaction of the solar wind
with the Earth's magnetic field, with emphasis
on the North Polar Cap. Hawkeye continued
the University of Iowa's Injun series, which
provided a comprehensive study of charged
particles trapped in the Earth's magneto.
sphere.
Centaur D1 and Centaur
Standard Shroud Projects
Lewis Research Center
Andrew Stofan, Manager
The original Centaur stage was designed in the
late 1950s and by the middle 1960s it needed up-
dating. Several small study efforts were con-
ducted in the 1966-69 time frame. An initial de-
velopment contract was awarded to Convair in
September 1969 to design, develop, manufacture
and deliver one improved Centaur D1 upper-
stage qualified vehicle. Included in the contract
were special test equipment, a ground station at
launch complex 36, tooling, and flight software.
The basic negotiated contract was for $24 mil-
lion with a period of performance from Septem-
ber 1969 to April 1972. The contract, which in-
cluded a cost-plus incentive fee/award fee, was
unique for its time.
The contract was later modified to provide a D1
Titan proof flight vehicle and a D1A vehicle for
Pioneer-G. The total contract cost increased to
$50 million. The total program was completed
4.8 percent under cost, the end items were deliv-
ered on schedule and the DIA vehicle met all ob-
jectives. Although the D1T vehicle proof flight
was terminated by a Centaur hydrogen boost
pump failure, the validity of all the new develop-
ments was demonstrated.
The project manager detailed major project ele-
ments in the development shop organization:
• Simplified procedures and paperwork.
Fewer formal documentation and reports
(from 260 to 105).
Segregation of program activities in con-
trolled plant areas.
Direct association of design engineers with
fabrication, assembly, and test personnel.
• Simplified drawing system.
Contractor program manager with overall
responsibilities for technical, schedule, and
financial aspects.
Highly motivated government-contractor
team with excellent communications.
Government-contractor team uses identical
controls:
- Schedules by Statement of Work (SOW).
- Financial data by SOW.
- Technical requirements by SOW.
Designation of contractor engineers for
total SOW responsibility--technical,
schedule, financial.
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Other successful project management elements
included:
• Task definition thoroughly understood.
Cost definition based upon realistic goals
with detailed backup rationale.
• Motivating contract features.
Proper program management organization
at NASA and contractor.
Appropriate management systems and
tools.
Studies of the Titan/Centaur launch vehicle
indicated that a combined payload nose fairing
and Centaur insulation system was desirable.
Later studies defined the concept of the Centaur
Standard shroud (CSS) to fulfill the study
requirements. The Shroud was sized
approximately 18.3m in length, 4.3m upper
diameter and 3.35m lower diameter to
accommodate the Viking payload and Centaur
and Viking lengths. Requests for proposals were
issued in July 1969. Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company, Inc., was awarded the contract.
Lockheed had extensive experience in building
similar large shrouds for the Air Force and had
a proven separation system. A cost-plus
incentive fee/award fee contract was again used;
however, this contract experienced a large cost
overrun and cost growth. The major reasons for
the growth were that the 4.3m constant
diameter Lockheed design caused extensive
Shroud/Centaur interface revisions and that the
Viking Program slipped two years. The overrun
was caused by contractor's military shroud
program development problems, the contractor
scrapping the "development shop" approach,
extensive personnel turnover in manufacturing,
and overhead and labor rate increases due to
reduced business volume.
Technical results:
CSS passed all qualification tests success-
fully and with relative ease. Only minor
problems occurred with insulation and
backup separation systems.
CSS performed flawlessly on proof flight
and Helios-A launches.
All hardware was delivered on time and all
major milestones were met.
Recommendations:
(1) Contract should not be started with major
inadequacies in the work statements.
(2) A "development shop" contractor organiza-
tion is mandatory to control costs on con-
tracts with a potential for engineering or
schedule changes.
(3) Contractor top-level management attention
and authority are vital in controlling
expenditures of contractor organizations
not under direct control of the project office.
(4) Defining sound interfaces between contrac-
tors is often the critical factor in controlling
overall project costs, and is worthy of the
utmost attention of contractor and NASA
upper management.
An enhanced Centaur rocket with a resized
shroud stands ready at Kennedy Space Center's
complex 36 in 1978 to launch the Pioneer Venus
Multiprobe, carrying four probes to enter the Ve-
nusian atmosphere.
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Mariner Mars 71
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Robert Parks
The final project discussed was Mariner Mars 71
managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL). The Mariner Mars 71 spacecraft weighed
2,266 pounds with an instrument package
weight of 151 pounds. The primary mission
objective was to study the dynamic charac-
teristics and to provide broad area observations
of the planet Mars from Martian orbit.
The project was formulated in the face of a
threat that no new planetary programs would be
approved unless attractive low-cost systems
could be provided. During this period, both the
Mars 71 Probe and the Voyager projects had
been canceled.
A study of the Mariner Mars 71 launch
opportunity revealed that it was the lowest
energy year in the 15-year cycle and the Atlas
Centaur could be used as the launch vehicle.
The original approach was to use the Mariner
Mars 69 science payload with no significant
modifications. However, this approach was
subsequently changed to include additional
instrumentation, modifications to the Mariner
Mars 69 instruments, and broader involvement
of science investigators. These changes resulted
in a cost increase from the initial estimate of $93
million to $106.3 million. JPL managed the
project in the subsystem contracting mode.
Summary of major cost drivers:
• Inflation.
• Mission scope changes:
- Science experiments.
- Adaptive mode for mission operations.
- Science data analysis expansion.
Experience with handling cost drivers:
Inflation--per direction, initial cost
estimate stated in 1968 dollars with no
allowance for inflation.
• Unanticipated technical problems.
Scope changes--additional science instru-
mentation.
Costs partially offset by deleting third
spacecraft.
Recommendations:
(1) Initial cost estimates should include an al-
lowance for inflation.
(2) A definitive statement of science payload
requirements, with an estimate of instru-
ment development costs and their effects on
spacecraft costs, is needed.
(3) Include some funding contingency to cover
costs of unforeseeable problems.
(4) Standardize, wherever practical, on de-
signs, components, and test procedures.
(5) Undertake block buys of identical hard-
ware subsystems.
(6) Share mission operations costs associated
with personnel and software.
I .
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Summary
These programs and projects--ranging in cost
from $1 million to $2.5 billionmshow not only
the vast diversity of NASA activities but also
the wide differences of opinion and strong, inde-
pendent thinking on the part of NASA program
and project managers. No two sets of cost drivers
or sets of recommendations are identical, but a
pattern does emerge. That pattern can best be
summed up in one word: planning. Good plans
make good projects. And good planning starts
with the selection of well-trained, competent
program and project management leaders and
teams.
All too often, especially in the early days,
program managers learned on the job. Ex-
perience is a good teacher, but there are other
ways to learn. There is no logical reason why we
must learn only from our mistakes when we can
learn from the mistakesmas well as successes--
of others. In this article, we have lists and lists
of reminders and suggestions from program and
project managers, many of whom have gone on
to lead bigger programs within the agency and
in industry. Their wisdom is valued and can be
worked into the curriculum of any upcoming
NASA project or program managers. Comparing
and contrasting methods and techniques in the
lists shows that while there is no one way to
plan a program and manage it, some ways may
be certainly better than others, and some are
lessons learned, never to be repeated.
The following recommendations were made to
the Deputy Administrator upon completion of
the workshops:
• Initiate training for project personnel
Hold periodic meetings with project person-
nel
Prepare "lessons learned" reports at the
completion of projects
Establish independent cost review teams to
verify estimated projects costs
Establish an agency-wide piece parts pur-
chase and qualification program
• Conduct a definitive reliability study
Establish a policy regarding research and
development in flight projects versus "en-
abling technology" under SR&T
Initiate pre-project approval buys and block
buys
Establish and manage funding contingen-
cies
Consider cost-at-completion versus cost-
per-FY for total cost management
Define Headquarters role in project man-
agement
It is interesting to note that only the first
recommendation was fully implemented and
even it failed for a time. The other
recommendations were well thought out and
made excellent sense but there were no sponsors
to carry them out.
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A Strategy of Co t Control for
Mariner Venus/Mercury '73
by John R. Biggs and Walter J. Downhower
The spacecraft NASA launched on November 3,
1973 to explore Venus and Mercury proved a
notable success both in space and on the ground,
as a development project. This article on the
development points out management
approaches and techniques that kept schedules
and controlled costs, the intent being to
stimulate thought about how to do the same
with future spacecraft and payloads.
The Mariner Venus/Mercury '73 (MVM '73)
project kept within its originally established
goals for schedule, performance, and cost.
Underlying this development success was the
availability of the Mariner technology. But
meeting the goals demanded management
determination, planning, and discipline to make
optimum use of state-of-the-art technology---on
the part of people at NASA, JPL, and The
Boeing Co. (the main contractor).
Pre-project Highlights
The earliest studies of the concept and scientific
potential of a Venus/Mercury swing-by mission
drew many to observe it could be the unique
mission of the decade. It was the first to use a
gravity-assist technique_taking advantage of
an unusual planetary configuration existing in
1973. Using the gravitational field of Venus, it
was possible to swing an Atlas-Centaur-
launched spacecraft onto a flight path to
Mercury. Exploration of Mercury otherwise
would not have been possible without employing
a much larger launch vehicle.
The 1968 Planetary Exploration Summer Study
conducted by the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) Space Science Board (SSB) endorsed this
mission. The SSB suggested that the mission be
planned around a single launch to make best use
of the science funds available to NASA.
Mission Objectives
The following mission objective, established by
NASA following the Summer Study in 1968, did
not change during the program's several years
of design and development:
Primary. During the 1973 opportunity, to
conduct exploratory investigations of the
planet Mercury's environment, atmosphere,
surface, and body characteristics and to ob-
tain environmental and atmospheric data
from Venus during the flyby. First priority
goes to Mercury investigations.
Secondary. To perform interplanetary ex-
periments while the spacecraft flies from
Earth to Mercury, and to obtain experience
with a gravity-assist mission.
JPL had long experience with planetary pro-
grams, but the opportunity for other Centers to
participate in the program was not foreclosed.
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
had plans for a Planetary Explorer spacecraft
potentially able to do the mission and its ap-
proach was sufficiently attractive to invite fur-
ther study. During the remainder of 1968 and
1969, both GSFC and JPL studied their respec-
tive concepts; this early competition contributed
to thoroughness of the early planning effort.
The Scientists
An innovative technique was used on MVM '73
to assure early involvement of the scientific
community with mission definition and prelimi-
nary design. In past missions, no effective
mechanism for the early detailed planning in-
volvement of outside scientists had evolved, and
selection of principal investigators had been
withheld until the completion of mission-profile
studies and early system determinations. By the
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time the investigators were selected in those
programs, many design features had already
been established.
For MVM '73, selected scientists were invited to
participate in the early mission planning. A
group of scientists representing the several dis-
ciplines to be involved in the science payload
was selected and formed into a Science Steering
Group (SSG) in September 1969. The scientists
influenced the early mission and spacecraft de-
sign, holding to a minimum conflict between
mission constraints and science needs.
Based on the positive results from these
planning efforts, MVM '73 was presented in the
FY70 NASA budget as an Office of Space
Science and Applications (OSSA) "new start" at
a funding level of $3 million. An Authorization
Conference Committee approved the project for
inclusion in the FY70 authorization action, and
funds were appropriated as requested. The
scientific principal investigators were then
selected in a normal fashion after project
authorization.
Robert S.Kraemer, then head ofplanetary plan-
ning at NASA, pressed innovation in the early
planning ofMVM '73.Kraemer latermoved to
the post ofplanetary program director,with re-
sponsibilityforimplementing the project.
The "Low-cost" Attitude
The "low-cost" attitude, so evident in the
management of MVM '73, developed early. The
study teams were instructed to consider
maximum use of established designs, residual
hardware, and existing capabilities. Very strict
financial constraints were factored into payload
planning. The SSG was requested to consider
minimum-cost experiments that would yield
acceptable scientific data. The potential
experiment proposers were advised to use
existingdesigns for science instruments, to use
flight-testedexperiments wherever possible,
and to consider modifications only for high-
payoff options.They were also to limit quality
assurance, reliability, and documentation
requirements to that previously applied to prior
successfulsimilarinstruments.
GSFC and JPL established the mission and
spacecraft baseline, developed preliminary
implementation plans incorporating the
experiment approach being followed by the SSG,
and made early cost estimates. JPL called on its
extensive experience with Mariner spacecraft.
Goddard proposed a spin-stabilized spacecraft of
the Explorer class.
JPL proposed to commit to a fixed cost to do the
MVM '73 mission in the system-contract mode.
W.H. Pickering, JPL director, advised OSSA in
December 1969 that JPL could and would un-
dertake the project for a cost not to exceed $98
million.
The JPL Goal
After a full briefing on the approaches by GSFC
and JPL (proposed science return, spacecraft
configurations, management modes, manpower
and cost projections), OSSA chose JPL. In a
letter to Dr. Pickering, assigning project
management to JPL, John E. Naugle, Associate
Administrator for Space Science, made this
comment regarding mission cost: "A major
concern has been and remains to be the total
runout cost of the project. I am sure you are
aware of the cost history for which estimates
have ranged from approximately $70 million to
well over $100 million. It is mandatory that the
project be accomplished for a total cost not
exceeding the $98 million quoted in your letter
and strong efforts should be taken to reduce this
figure." This letter set the fundamental cost
understanding between OSSA and JPL.
The "Work Package" Concept
JPL expertise in conducting flight projects
predominantly involved obtaining spacecraft
subsystems from industry thorough the JPL
technical divisions with JPL accomplishing the
spacecraft systems functions. The major
challenge faced by JPL in the MVM '73 project
was to utilize and adapt the fundamental JPL
strengths to a system-contracting mode.
A JPL team suggested a "work package" concept
as the best means to transition from the use of
subsystem contractors to a systems contractor.
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Appropriate elements of the JPL matrix organi-
zation prepared the work packages.
The Project Office exercised system technical di-
rection, but the detailed definition, monitoring,
and control of individual work units was per-
formed by the appropriate JPL organizational
element under the overall coordination of the
JPL Project Office.
JPL alsodetermined other factorsimportant to
implementing the project.It selected a cost
contract with award fee. A specific JPL
procurement group co-locatedwith the Project
Officewould administer the system contractand
other MVM '73-relatedones.Itwas decided that
the JPL in-house tasks should be given as much
visibilityand control as those of the system
contractor.The constrainton resourcesdictated
that allelements ofthe project,regardlessofthe
performing organization, be monitored in the
same detail,and the risks balanced across all
portions of the project's activities.
PAD, Procedures and Payoff
The NASA project-approval process entails a
basic contract or understanding between the
Administrator and the responsible Program
Associate Administrator: the Program
Authorization Document (PAD). The initial
PAD for the MVM '73 project was signed on
February 27, 1970. The objectives,technical
plan, major support interfaces,and procurement
approach discussed in that PAD remained
unchanged throughout the development.
The JPL approach strongly exercised the
Mariner heritage. MVM '73 benefited not only
from Mariner design derivation but also from
residual hardware from past programs. The plan
emphasized maximum use of existing designs,
hardware and software. This approach saved
perhaps 50 percent of design and development
costs and perhaps 15 percent in hardware
costsma big payoff.
The Cutting Edge
The project team had lengthy discussions with
JPL implementing organizations to identify the
optimum way to meet cost constraints. Control
of cost-at-completion became a basic concept
stressed by both the JPL and Headquarters
offices in an attempt to avoid the less-efficient,
year-by-year funding controls often followed in
projects. The MVM '73 project made it clear that
each assigned work unit was the total
responsibility of the cognizant division and that
responsibility for determining the least costly
way to do the work rested squarely with the
division. For each potential increase in cost,
something had to be cut back. The JPL divisions
almost invariably proposed specific cuts
concurrent with notification to the project office
of potential cost increases.
Schedule Strategy
The schedule adopted for MVM '73 provided an
unusually long period for advanced planning
and deferred this start of major contracts. This
approach, unprecedented in launch-critical
planetary programs, may have been the single
most important factor in meeting cost goals.
The added risk to the mission was offset by the
increase in design time and better planning of
the fabrication effort. The effect was to establish
a "most cost-effective" approach. The greatest
number of people worked on the project for the
shortest period of time. (Axiom: the shorter the
schedule, the less the cost.)
Once adopted as a project philosophy, delay in
implementation was applied to all aspects of the
project. The systems contract was delayed three
months beyond the schedule considered minimal
by many. Other subcontract work was released
on a schedule that limited the work time to a
prudent minimum. A "single thread" approach
was followed in the spacecraft design where
options were studied, one was adopted, and the
work started without carrying parallel efforts.
Mission operations work was held off beyond the
schedule previously considered to be optimum.
Flight operations crew training was held off as
long as possible. And it worked! There were no
major schedule slippages, no seriously late
deliveries of equipment, and no extraordinary
work-arounds.
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"Do Only the Essential"
"Do Only the Essential" became a discipline
among project participants. To challenge the
need for each operation, each added procedure,
each piece of special equipment, and each
separate design, redundant feature or test
became routine. If a function, part, or operation
was determined to be needed, then the search
went on to see if hardware was available from
other projects, or if the process had been
developed by someone else. If the part or process
was not available, then there was an attempt to
use available designs.
This disciplinewas not only applied by the JPL
managers but by Boeing as well. The Boeing
spacecraftprogram manager proved extremely
resourcefulin identifyingshort-cuts,reductions
in paperwork, and unnecessary redundancyB
the cost-typecontractnot withstanding. The list
ofhardware and effortsaved through thiseffort
istoo lengthy todiscusshere,but the savings ex-
tended toevery area ofthe projecteffort.
One unusual saving is notable. The project team
encouraged a local college, assisted by several
other colleges and high schools, to produce the
spacecraft models, which often cost more than
$100,000. The project gained all the models re-
quired, the students and schools gained good ex-
perience from their work on an interesting task,
and NASA saved dollars and encouraged local
community interest and support.
Project Team
The most important ingredients to project
success were the attitudes and skills of the
people assigned to manage it. JPL's experience
in dealing with a system contractor was limited
to Surveyor, and by 1970 relatively few JPL
people had been involved in the early stages of
that project. The person most familiar with its
operations was Walker E. "Gene" Giberson, who
had been Surveyor's project manager. He was
appointed MVM '73 project manager in January
1970.
Giberson assembled a small team ofindividuals,
each selectedon the basis of his past project
experience and his willingness to work within
firm budget allocations. The key members of
this team included V.C. Clarke, Jr., mission
analysis and engineering manager; J.A. Dunne,
project scientist; J.R. Casani, spacecraft system
manager; J.N. Wilson, assistant spacecraft
system manager and N. Sirri, mission operation
system manager, This team, trim in size yet
representing broad experience, represented the
core of MVM '73 project management.
The Guidelines
At first, the team spent considerable time
developing the project's operating concepts and
indoctrinating everyone involved with the
organizational and project philosophy. They set
and held to the following guidelines throughout
the project:
• Establish early project guidelines, objectives
and constraints
• Use a small stafffor planning
• Prepare detailed plans and tasks before
initiating a contract:
- Specific and detailed RFPs
- A careful tradeoffassessment between
JPL and contractor furnished equipment
- Use of existing documents, reports, and
systems
- Careful selection of fee approach
• Establish cost-at-completion planning,
budgeting and emphasis
• Secure all contracts before starting work
• Keep work and budget plans up-to-date
• Exercise organizational impedance
matching and communications
• Maximize technical interaction
• Use the concept of cognizant work unit
engineer
• Hold frequent face-to-face meetings of
operating managers
• Identify and resolve problems promptly
• Make periodic status and performance
reviews
• Indoctrinate all involved with cost goals
- Instill cost consciousness
- Make cost goals believable
- Develop a clear understanding of the
cost-control system
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• Bring manpower onto the project and move
it off in a timely manner
The Hot Seat
The Headquarters Program Office/Center
Project Office interface can be extremely critical
to the success of a project. If the program mana-
ger and project manager have differing am-
bitions and objectives or, as occurred in some
instances, an adversarial relationship, the
project can suffer. N. William Cunningham, the
Headquarters program manager, and Gene
Giberson, the JPL project manager, enjoyed an
open and forthright relationship, a cornerstone
of a sound management structure.
The person on the "hot seat" for cost
management is, however, the project manager.
The project manager is the one most responsible
for establishing the attitude and the framework
for the daily tradeoffs of cost, performance, and
schedule where it is most essential to maintain a
proper perspective. Without his cost conscious-
ness, his basic approach to costs, MVM '73 would
not have enjoyed it obvious cost success. This
cost attitude is the more unusual since NASA
had previously stressed technical performance
and schedule requirements over cost as a
discipline.
The Science Steering Group selected in Septem-
ber 1969 held its final meeting in March 1970.
In its report, the SSG recommended a minimum
science payload composed of a plasma science
experiment, a magnetometer, an infrared radi-
ometer, an ultraviolet spectrometer, a television
system, and an energetic particles experiment.
One of the tasks of SSG was to make a detailed
cost estimate for each potential experiment--
including design, development and fabrication
costs of the hardware, cost of personnel support
for launch and mission operations, and cost of
data analysis and interpretation and
publication of results. These cost estimates, plus
a project estimate for integrating the
instruments into the spacecraft, shaped the first
science budget for the project at $13 million.
An Announcement of Flight Opportunity (AFO)
issued in March 1970 invited proposals for ex-
periments. It stressed the intent to select only
proven flight-qualified instruments. The AFO
also stressed the desire to minimize documenta-
tion and stated the intent of JPL to monitor de-
velopment of the instruments only at the inter-
face level.
Forty-six proposals were received and evaluat-
ed. After ranking them in terms of science excel-
lence, technical and engineering requirements,
cost and system integration, the program office
recommended seven payloads to the OSSA Asso-
ciate Administrator. The payload cost estimates
went as follows (in millions of dollars):
Television $6.226M
Radio science 0.500
Ultraviolet 0.575
Infrared 0.928
Magnetometer 0.688
Energetic particles 0.383
Plasma science 0.945
Total $10.245
Instrument integration 2.355
Total $12.600
To each of the principal investigators selected,
Dr. Naugle addressed this comment: "I must
emphasize, once again, that the total negotiated
figure (dollar cost as selected) cannot be
exceeded. Accordingly, I have instructed the
JPL Project Office that in the event of an
anticipated cost overrun, their alternatives will
consist of helping you to reduce the scope of your
experiment, or recommending its termination."
Science and Dollars
Whereas most past selections had been consid-
ered final at the time of announcement, the let-
ter from Dr. Naugle clearly pointed out that the
selection was to be considered tentative until
the investigators and JPL completed negotia-
tions. A process of fact-finding and negotiation
between JPL and each of the scientific investi-
gators followed, which resulted in well-defined
relationships before the major development ef-
fort commenced.
It was made clear in the selection and negotia-
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tion process that the principal investigator was
responsible for the implementation and develop-
ment of the investigation, including the instru-
ment. The project office followed through on the
intent to control principally at the instru-
ment/spacecraft interface level. The systems
contractor was responsible for integration of the
instruments into the spacecraft.
One innovative technique required the systems
contractor to "sign off" on changes to experiment
interface drawings, although the contracts for
the experiments were between JPL and the in-
vestigator. This technique provided greater as-
surance that the systems contractor was aware
of the latest configuration of the experiment
hardware, and helped avoid surprises at the
time of integration.
Dr. Naugle views MVM '73 as the most success-
ful development of scientific instruments within
tight cost constraints. The addition of the ex-
periment integration costs to delivered cost
brings the total for science very close to but
within the original budget of $13 million.
Meeting payload cost goals begs the question
whether controls compromised the science in-
vestigations. A detailed review of the develop-
ment history of each instrument clearly demon-
strated that not only was there no compromise of
the investigations during development, but that
significant capability was added to several in-
vestigations. Any science compromise on MVM
'73 reflects directly the original constraints es-
tablished before experiments were selected. The
decisions to tightly constrain payload costs, to
fly only proven instruments, and to apply go/no-
go cost restrictions on instrument development
are serious policy decisions to be carefully
weighed and considered. They cannot be applied
to every payload but they paid off in MVM '73.
NASA and JPL held an industry briefing in Feb-
ruary 1970 to apprise companies of the goals and
constraints of the MVM '73, to provide detailed
technical and program information for early
planning, to encourage competition, and to en-
list industry's help in determining an optimum
role for a system contractor. Forty-one firms at-
tended the briefing.
JPL asked the companies for suggestions re-
garding implementation of the systems contract
approach; separate day-long meetings were held
with the most interested competitors to discuss
their suggestions. During these meetings, the
companies made recommendations on contract
scope, roles and relationships, Mariner technol-
ogy transfer, contract type, GFP handling and
other areas they believed were important to the
success of the effort.
A procurement plan evolved in which the sys-
tems contractor would have the major role (1) to
design, fabricate, assemble, and test one flight
spacecraft, one test spacecraft, associated test
models, test and support equipment and appro-
priate spares; and (2) to provide level-of-effort
support to JPL in mission analysis and engi-
neering, JPL subsystems activities, and mission
operations.
RFP Features
The JPL project definition effort had been pro-
ceeding for a year at the time the Request for
Proposals (RFP) was issued. The result of that
effort was a very detailed, explicit RFP. It was
an extensive compendium explaining project ob-
jectives, project organization and implementa-
tion, schedule, project control dates and docu-
ments, work breakdown structure, spacecraft
design summary, scope of contract, general de-
scription of work, JPL/contractor relationships,
and mission operations. Its most unusual fea-
tures included these:
• A spacecraft systems specification which
attempted to state only minimum
requirements.
• The predetermined intent to divide all work
into discreet work units (which allowed
separation of responsibilities and facilitated
work description, understanding,
negotiation, and JPL monitoring). The
definition of each work unit was written in a
standard format.
• The request for firms to propose overhead
cost ceilings.
• The request for baseline and alternate cost
proposals to get the best cost mix between
JPL and contractor-furnished equipment.
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$ A callforincentiveproposalswhich gave
heavy emphasis tocost,but also
statedstrongpreferencetoaward fee.
• Emphasis on minimum documentation and
maximum use ofprocedures,forms,
techniques,etc.,that the contractor
currently used.
• Detailed documentation covering Mariner
'69hardware, Mariner '71hardware, and
other JPL-furnished equipment, along with
drawings, schematics,processesand
procedures toassure fulluse ofthe Mariner
heritage and facilitatecostestimates.
Four proposals were received.The Source Eval-
uation Board presentation was made to the
NASA Administrator on April 28,1971, and The
Boeing Co. was selectedas the systems contrac-
tor.
Holding Out for a Firm Negotiated Contract
The pressure to award the contract and
commence work was very strong following the
April selection,but the project manager and
contract manager held out fora firm negotiated
contract before allowing work to be started.
Within six-and-one-halfweeks after selection,
the negotiationswere completed and a definitive
contractwas awarded. Work startedon June 17,
1971.
The contract, a cost-plus-award-fee type, empha-
sized the contractor's complete responsibility to
meet the spacecraft system performance re-
quirements. The contract effort was divided into
work units, each assigned to a manager within
The Boeing Co. The work tinits included in the
contract were compatible with both JPL's tech-
nical division organization and Boeing's project
structure.
Controlling Overhead
A serious concern in systems contracting had
been the inabilityto predictoverhead costs.The
parties agreed that a ceilingon overhead costs
would be negotiatedintothe contract.Such ceil-
ings on overhead are unusual in normal circum-
stances,and allthe more so in thiscase,consid-
ering the depressed economic situationThe Boe-
ing Co. faced in the spring of 1971. The ceiling
on overhead never was invoked because Boeing
actuallyunderran the negotiated overhead cost.
There were strong cost incentives negotiated
into the contract and a process for evaluation
and award was developed with emphasis on
performance and cost control. The award fee
provisions and the system employed to carry
them out appear to have been effective in
contributing to the contractor's performance.
Benefits included these:
• Boeing's spacecraftprogram manager had
the opportunity toincreasethe fee
significantly.The award feestructure
allowed broad latitudeinthe approach to
costand performance tradeoffs.
• The processenforced periodic,results-
orientedevaluationsand communications at
alllevels.The processand the resultant
dialogue tended toremove the obstaclesthat
stand in the way ofthe natural motivation to
do a good job.By clarifyinggoals,
establishingemphasis, eliminating
misunderstandings, and highlighting
problem areas formutual attention,
obstacleswere removed or reduced.
• Attention ofthe contractor'stop
management was obtained by the formal
feedback process(briefingssupported by
letters).
Category of
Indirect Expense
Engineering
Manufacturing
Productive Material
Subcontract Material
Area Administration
Group Administration (remote)
CY 1971 CY1972
Negotiated Per
Contract Actual
Negotiated Per
Contract Actual
$3.94 $3.74 $4.14 $3.88M
4.99 5.08 5.24 4.97
10.5% 7.9% 10.5% 6.7%
6.1% 5.5% 6.1% 3.6%
15.1% 14.35% 15.1% 11.9%
9.6% 9.75% 9.6% 7.8%
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The discipline of the award fee evaluation
process improved JPL's internal
communications at all levels, including top
management on the award fee review board.
Tight Control
JPL has a reputation in the industry for aggres-
sive contract management, often expressed as
complaints of "too tight control" by subcontrac-
tors. But the JPL system proves effective in as-
suring performance.
In MVM '73, change orders were kept to a mini-
mum throughout the contract and were negoti-
ated into the contract promptly after issuance.
Project office personnel monitored Boeing's
work very closely. The work unit breakdown
made it possible for cognizant JPL engineers to
thoroughly understand the job, follow its
progress in detail, and identify potential prob-
lems early.
Early identification of problems coupled with
open, candid discussions among The Boeing Co.
and JPL managers were basic contributors to
the success of the project. D.T. Gant, contracts
manager, L.V. Burden, financial manager, and
L.M. Bates, cost analyst, who were collocated in
the project office, effectively kept the project
managers alert to unexpected deviations.
The NASA Management Audit Office, not noted
for its approbative descriptions of NASA oper-
ations, gave this appraisal: "In our opinion, the
JPL surveillance of the contract, its assignment
of capable and motivated personnel to monitor
the performance of MVM '73 on a full-time ba-
sis, and the apparent stringent cost controls im-
plemented by The Boeing Co. before contract
award, and retained throughout the program,
contributed to Boeing's successful cost perfor-
mance under MVM '73."
Good Communications
Stressed by the managers, good communications
led to early anticipation and resolution of issues
and the timely availability of data for decision
making. Some of the techniques used to assure
good communications included:
• A weekly"Agreement/Disagreement Log,"
maintained by work unit personnel and
reviewed by the JPL spacecraft system
manager and The Boeing Co. spacecraft
program manager.
• Weekly face-to-face meetings between the
systems contractor, systems manager and
the systems contractor program manager.
• A weekly summary of agreements and
formal tracking of action items.
• Daily meetings between The Boeing Co. test
and operations representatives and the JPL
resident staff during the system test period.
• Weekly "Problem TWX."
• Formal monthly progress reviews to give an
overview and detailed status and plans with
particular emphasis on problems.
• Easy access to The Boeing Co. and JPL top
management (above the level of project
personnel).
• Attendance at award fee briefings by
Boeing's top management.
• An extensive and definitive award fee letter
and briefing, held not later than 15 days
after the end of each period.
• Rapid escalation of significant problems to
the appropriate management level for
resolution.
None of these actions should surprise good man-
agers, but taken together, they may not be com-
monplace. These combined techniques greatly
helped the MVM '73 project meet its goals.
Highlights of Contractor Performance
The Boeing Co. faced an uncertain general busi-
ness position at the time the MVM '73 project
contract was issued. Major reductions had been
made in Boeing's commercial airplane oper-
ations, and significant reductions in employ-
ment had been made at Boeing Aerospace Co.
Despite the drastic reduction in backlog and di-
rect workload, Boeing was able to reduce over-
head costs and even underrun the overhead pro-
jections on the MVM '73. The aerospace industry
and its government customers are conditioned to
the increase of overhead runs when the direct
base decreases. This "fact" is considered by
many to be axiomatic and inviolate--overhead
39
StrategyofCostControl
costsregardedas "fixed" or unalterable and nec-
essary to support the base for doing business.
The example of Boeing's experience in 1970 and
1971 could be a good case study in ways to re-
duce overhead expense as the direct base de-
creases.
E. Czarnechi served as The Beoing Co. MVM
spacecraftprogram manager from the early pro-
posal phases in 1970 through early 1973. H.
Kennett served as deputy program manager and
succeeded Czarnechi. Their participationcontri-
buted immensely to the success of MVM '73.
They have reviewed their experience,and un-
derscoredthese management concepts and tech-
niques employed on MVM '73:
• Spacecraftrequirements must be defined
clearlyand early.
• Match people (skills)towork unit tasks.
• Use the "cognizantwork unit engineer"
concept
• Selectthe baseline configurationearly.
• Implement a system ofprogram reviews and
reportingwith jointchairmanship by
contractorand customer.
• Define and assesstechnicalperformance,
schedule,and costrisks,and develop work
around plans.
• Educate key personnel in the company's
cost-accountingsystem sothat when
tradeoffsand decisionsare tobe made, all
factorsare properly considered and their
true impact on costunderstood.
• Shorten and improve communications
through collocationand program
organization
• Establishorganizationalrelationships(e.g.,
JPL/Boeing) and communication channels
early.
• Motivate peoplethrough performance
assessment, promotion, compensation, and
achievement awards.
• Emphasize costtradesduring design phase.
• Ensure that only essentialwork is
accomplished.
• Use an objectiveperformance measurement
system.
• Rely on each cognizant work unitengineer
forearlyidentification,reporting and, when
feasible,problem resolution.
• Use dedicatedmanufacturing and test
facilities.
• On-load and off-loadmanpower in a timely
fashion.
• Use recovery ("tiger") teams to work
problems. Teams of specialists from outside
the program can be assigned problems and
provide instant expertise without a
continued expense to the program.
A Postscript
The MVM '73 spacecraft (Mariner 10) was
launched on November 3, 1973. A number of
problems developed early in the flight,but none
degraded the mission and none was the obvious
result of actions taken to control cost. The
spacecraft reached Venus on February 5, 1974,
and returned a full set of scientific data,
including more than 4,000 pictures. The
gravitational attraction of Venus altered the
spacecraft's flight path as planned, swinging it
toward Mercury. The spacecraft passed within
500 miles of Mercury's surface on March 29,
1974, and returned the first close scientific
observations and pictures of the planet.
The project is currently [1974] anticipating a
modest underrun at completion. So MVM '73
more than met its original performance objec-
tives and, in addition, served to work out man-
agement approaches and techniques to control
costs.
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Experiment
Infrared
Radiometer
Plasma
Science
Charged
Particle
Telescope
Appointment
LetterCost/
OSE _l*
Science Cost History
Original
Negotiated Cost
/March 30, 1971)
Estimated
Cost-at-Completion
$_October 31, 1973)
$ 789,000/ $ 759,000 $
21,000
945,000/ 1,020,000
75,000
383,000/ 391,000
8,000
Magnetic 685,000/ 710,000
Field 25,000
Ultraviolet 575,000/ 575,000 C2_
Spectrometer 24,000
726,000
Television
Science
Radio Science
and Celestial
Mechanics
1,020,000
505,000
671,000
705,000
475,000/--- 475,000 555,000
500,000/--- 500,000 500,000
4,505,000 4,430,000
TV System 5,751,000 5,765,000
TOTAL $ 10,256,000 $ 10,195,000 $
4,682,000
5,787,000
10,469,000
± Cost-at-
Completion
$84,000
0
+ 114,000
39,000
+ 106,000
+ 80,000 (31
+ 177,000
+ 36,000
+$213,000
(I) OSE-Operational Support
(2) Did not Include Bench Checkout Equipment (BCE)
(3) Raw Mosiac Costs-Change In Scope
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The Shuttle:
A Balancing of Design and Politics
by Dale D. Myers
When Apollo was started, and even deep into the
program, NASA had very little integrated
planning. No one tried to balance efforts
between aeronautics and space, or even manned
versus unmanned activities. Jim Webb seemed
to want to keep his options open until the last
minute, and a long range plan would be a
deterrent to that idea. Planning groups were set
up, but no lasting results emerged. Even the
planning of the science experiments for Apollo,
worked almost entirely between Manned Space
Flight and the Office of Space Science and
Applications, was late getting into the system.
When it came to real post-ApoUo planning, even
though there were pockets of studies and
interest, no overall plan emerged until 1969.
Detailed specifications from the Congress and
their staffs were not a major problem. Congress
would want to be kept informed about our
planning (no surprises) but in general, their role
was supportive.
In 1969, the Space Council, under Vice Presi-
dent Agnew, ran a post-Apollo study, with most
of the inputs coming from NASA through Dr.
Tom Paine, who, as Deputy Administrator, was
a member of the task force. Dr. George Mueller,
then Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, made some strong inputs to the study.
NASA's budget had peaked in 1966, but ex-
trapolations based on the strong support of the
public led to a very ambitious outlook. As usual,
NASA saw the budget reduction as a temporary
thing, failing to understand the growing Viet-
nam budget, and leaders of the Congress and the
administration increasingly fearing a failure in
space.
The results of the post-Apollo study were:
First, we must reduce the cost per pound to
orbit by a factor of ten. This would be done
with a reusable launch vehicle.
A reusable Space Tug was needed to reduce
the costs from low Earth orbit to geostation-
ary orbit.
We must have a large, Saturn V-launched
space station.
With the Space Station as a base, we must
place a permanent colony on the moon.
• Then, we must explore Mars with people.
The 1969 task force study also had some ambi-
tious projections for the near future of American
spaceflight: NASA planned to complete the
Apollo program by 1972 with the Apollo 18 mis-
sion, and Skylab A was to be completed by 1974.
As Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, I had some projections of my own in 1970.
Skylab B was also planned for early 1976, the
first flight of the Space Shuttle in 1976, a large
Space Station by 1980, and the beginning of con-
struction on a lunar base by 1985.
In the meantime, after 1967, the NASA budget
started falling at about 14 percent per year.
Manned Space Flight's budget was cut in half
from 1966 to 1971. Part of that decline was
because Congress and the administration were
beginning to have misgivings about the
continued risk of lunar flights. So were some in
NASA. By 1970, it was obvious that the decline
would continue, and drastic action had to be
taken in planning NASA's future.
First, all studies and technologies associated
with Mars were stopped. We canceled Skylab B.
Then Apollo 18 was canceled (under pressure
from Congress). Finally, the lunar base and the
large Space Station were deferred, with the final
launch of Saturn V then pegged to Skylab A.
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As budget pressures continued, we held discus-
sions with European nations to consider their
roles in space exploration. We discussed their
providing parts for the Space Shuttle, the whole
Space Tug and finally settled on Spacelab as an
appropriate item for European interests. Many
painful diplomatic discussions were held in that
series of negotiations. Space Tug was dropped.
The order of priority for the cutback was based
on a conviction that if we could just reduce the
cost of transportation to low Earth orbit dra-
matically, the future would fall back in place.
In 1970, we already had underway a Phase A
study of the fully recoverable, two-stage Shuttle.
Budget pressures from the administration were
continuing, and although no numbers had been
developed, it was evident that a program above
$10 billion would not fly. Industry saw the prob-
lem, too, and began to come up with partially re-
coverable systems. In 1971, the administration
began to talk about $5 billion for the develop-
ment program, and it was clear that we now had
to look very seriously at partially recoverable
systems. Consequently, many new configura-
tions were studied, leading to a number of possi-
bilities, fully costed and ready for use in cost
trade studies.
At about the same time, and after a long debate
with the Office of Management and Budget,
NASA agreed to demonstrate the cost effective-
ness of a reusable shuttle system. This decision
had an enormous impact on the design decisions
for the program.
We hired Mathematicians, with Dr. Klaus P.
Heiss as the project leader, to run a total cost
versus total savings study for a 20-year period.
The key cost data for this study was the develop-
ment costs, the cost per flight, the number of
flights per year, and Shuttle effects on the cost of
payloads.
The Development Costs
A two-stage,fully recoverable launch vehicle
was our startingpoint.We looked at Max Hunt-
er'ssinglestage to orbitmodel, but decided that
the structureweight leftus with no reserves.We
recognized that with the Saturn V production
line being closed down, the vehicle should have
a large diameter payload bay to accommodate a
future Space Station. We had an agreement
with the administration that NASA would pay
for development of the Shuttle, and that the Air
Force could use it if they paid launch costs.
When we made that offer to the Air Force, they
agreed, but wanted a cross range capability to
return to base during polar launches from Van-
denburg AFB. We agreed, because it was becom-
ing obvious that to meet the cost effectiveness
criteria, we would need all the launches we
could get. As noted above, European space inter-
ests had agreed to build Spacelab, thereby add-
ing reusable payloads.
Cost Per Flight
Launch costs were badly underestimated. Al-
most all our emphasis was put into pushing
down the development costs to get under the ad-
ministration's bogey. Although President Nixon
was a space buff, I am convinced that he and
OMB were in lockstep in demanding a less cost-
ly Shuttle. Unfortunately, we relied too heavily
on airline-supplied data on what this airplane-
like device could cost per flight if we followed
airline maintenance and on-line checkout rules.
NASA's lack of an operations voice at or near
the top of the agency caused us to naively be-
lieve (or hopefully believe?) that these very low
costs per flight could be met. In retrospect, I
have become convinced that some of the project-
ed launch costs reductions could have been ob-
tained, had the entire design team concentrated
on operations as strongly as they concentrated
on development.
Number of Flights Per Year
I believe our final cost effectiveness study was
based on 50 or 60 flights per year. After all, we
were going to have drastic reductions in cost per
flight, particularly at high flight rates. With the
airline industry's advice that we could check the
Shuttle out like a commercial transport, our pro-
jections of manpower at the Cape were much
smaller than for the Saturn program. We had a
large projection of Air Force payloads, the prom-
ise of European payloads in addition to Space
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Spacelab, and a plan to build relatively cheap
scientific payloads that could be modified be-
tween flights and flown over and over. Finally,
we expected to carry a large number of commer-
cial payloads, most of which would be communi-
cations satellites.
The Cost of Payloads
With the Shuttle's capability to carry bulky,
heavy payloads, the concept developed that we
could build heavy, simple "I-beam" structures
for a space bus system, load them with instru-
ments, and fly them over and over, with a differ-
ent, or upgraded instrument package. We could
leave them in space, and then recover them,
modify them, and redeliver them to space. With
low costs per launch, and many launches, this
projected reduction in payload cost contributed
to the cost effectiveness of the system.
The Results
Even with these aggressively cost-effective
numbers, the study results showed, that to be
fully cost effective we had to go with one of the
lowest development cost systems. OMB, I'm
sure, expected that result, and Congress liked it
because of other budget pressures. Whatever the
outcome of the study, the administration had de-
cided that NASA could have any kind of Shuttle
it wanted, as long as the development costs were
equal to or lower than $5.5 billion. In January
1972, when the Shuttle go-ahead was given by
President Nixon, Jim Fletcher got a handshake
agreement for an additional 20 percent reserve
over my 15 percent reserve (mine was included
in the $5.5 billion). That 20 percent reserve, had
we applied it to reducing operational costs, could
have made a big difference. Unfortunately, the
reserve was essentially removed by the adminis-
tration when a leak occurred and the Wall
Street Journal reported that the cost could run
as high as $6.6 billion.
Design Considerations
While the costeffectivenessstudy was going on,
some important trade studies continued
throughout the Phase A, Phase B, and Phase
B+ studies carried out by industry. Decisions
were
were made at the top level of NASA on items
that affected the Program Authorization Docu-
ment. These included the studies that led to a
blended delta wing rather than a straight wing,
the choice of parallel boosters rather than a se-
ries booster, solid strap-ons rather than liquid,
the payload bay size (length and width), payload
weight, and cross range.
A report written by Charles Donlan in 1972 (fol-
lowing this article) summarized the wide rang-
ing configuration studies done between 1970
and the end of 1971. It is important to note that
in many cases, decisions were made which re-
duced the development cost at the expense of op-
erating costs. The choice of solid boosters is a
case in point. NASA had extensive experience
with liquid boosters, but there was overwhelm-
ing evidence that solids would be over a billion
dollars less expensive to develop than liquids.
There was also a 100 percent reliability record
for large solids at that time. In the final review
concerning choice of solids or liquids, we were
presented evidence that we could cancel the sol-
id motor thrust in flight, and even abort from
them. Later, we found that we could not escape
from the solids, but would be better off riding
them out. But, at the time, we had concluded
that we had very low development cost, very
high reliability, an abort capability, and a
means of reducing the cost per flight by recover-
ing and reusing the solids.
Postscript
NASA did well in meeting the development cost
set out for the program. They missed it by about
5 to 10 percent in 1971 dollars.
They missed badly on operational costs. First,
the airline idea of designing with triple redun-
dancy, but flying with a system out, was naively
accepted at the time, but was never possible in
manned flight. The risk, and the relatively un-
developed systems, could not be compared to
commercial aircraft's 30 years of evolutionary
development. Second, with NASA's approach to
checking all critical circuits and understanding
the personality of all components used for our
manned flights, there was no way we could
come.
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come close to the number of 50 to 60 flights per
year used in the study (and flights per year is
the dominant factor in cost per flight).
A rough estimate of how well we did in
operations costs can be reached by correcting
our 1971 figures for the increase in cost per
flightresultingfrom flying 12 per year rather
than 50,and then comparing those coststothose
correctedestimates from 1971 (inreal dollars).
We stillmissed our costsper flightby a factorof
two or three.Lost over the years,however, was
the factthat the originalcosts per flightwere
based on accounting only for the "additive
costs,"over and above the personnel who would
be in placeifwe did not have a Shuttle.
There have been a few ruggedly designed pay-
loads,but there was never a NASA directiveto
have any. There have been a few payloads recov-
ered,and a few fixedin orbit,but the bookkeep-
ing doesn't show a reduction in transportation
costtogivecreditto the transportationsystem.
All things considered, I judge the Shuttle to be a
resounding success. It has done everything in
space that we set out to do. Perhaps, considering
the 1970 budget setting, there was no other way
to get a program going than through the some-
what ethereal cost effectiveness approach that
was taken.
The configuration of the Shuttle has been su-
perb. To fly from Mach 25 to a perfect landing is
a major step forward in aeronautics, but to do it
with the configuration that was defined at the
end of phase B is a tribute to the team of NASA
and industry personnel who defined it.
Finally, the Program Authorization Document
system worked. That relatively limited set of re-
quirements, approved by the Administrator or
the Deputy, brought stability to the program.
No change to those few top specifications could
be made without convincing the Administrator
of the need. That was priceless in holding down
changes during the development program.
Shuttle Comparison
Full), External
Reusable LH2 Tanks
F-1
Flyback
Series
Liquid
Parallel Parallel
Liquid Solid
Rocket
Motor
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Space Shuttle Systems Definition Evolution
by Charles J. Donlan
Acting Director, Space Shuttle Program
July 11, 1972
The initial studies, begun in 1969-70, addressed a fully reusable shuttle system which emphasized
minimum refurbishment, autonomous on-board checkout, minimum turnaround time, and the low-
est operational cost of any system studied. The operational cost, about $4 million per flight, is about
the same as for the Thor Delta launch vehicle--the most widely used launch vehicle in the United
States. The development costs of the fully reusable system, however, approach $10 billion and re-
flect the extensive research and development activity associated with developing two large piloted
vehicles that possess both the features of a rocket launch vehicle and a hypersonic aircraft.
Further studies yielded a system with a smaller, more efficient orbiter by the use of expendable hy-
drogen tanks, rather than propellant tanks located in the orbiter. The booster staging velocity was
lowered from 11,000 feet per second for the fully reusable system to 7,000 feet per second. This al-
lowed use of a heat sink booster so that the development costs were lowered to $8 billion. The ex-
pendable tankage, of course, meant somewhat higher operational costs of $4 million per flight. The
high risk and high peak annual funding associated with developing two piloted vehicles still existed
and studies for lower cost systems continued.
Eventually,by removing both the liquidoxygen and liquidhydrogen from within the orbiter,NASA
was ableto devise a much smaller, lower costorbiterwith a singleexpendable combined propellant
tank. The sizeof the orbiterand itsdevelopment costswere dramatically reduced while retaining
equal performance capabilityby utilizingthisexpendable tank for both liquidpropellants.The se-
lectedorbiterisa deltawing aircraft,powered by high pressure hydrogen-oxygen engines.
Time phasing some ofthe orbitersubsystems received considerablestudy effort.This was known as
the Mark I/Mark IIshuttlesystem. The Mark Iorbiterwas touse availableablativethermal protec-
tion,a J-2S engine developed as a extension ofthe existingSaturn J-2 engine, and other state-of-
the-artcomponents such as existingavionics.Improved subsystems such as fullyreusable thermal
protectionand the new high pressure engine would be phased intolaterorbitersto achieve the oper-
ationalsystem (Mark If).This time-phasing reduced expenditures early in the development cycle,
but the Mark Isystem had reduced payload and crossrange capabilityas well as an increased turn-
around time ofone month. This represented a severelossinoperationalcapability.Furthermore, the
totaldevelopment coststoachieve the fullMark IIsystem actuallyincreased.
Additional studies indicated that further reductions in orbiter development costs could only be
achieved at the expense of compromising the objectives of providing the required flexible orbital ca-
pability at low operational costs. The possibility was considered of reducing total systems costs
through reducing the size of the payload bay in the orbiter from 4.6 X 18 meters (15 X 60 feet) to 4.3
X 14 meters (14 X 45 feet) and reducing the payload capability for a due east launch from 29,500
kilograms (65,000 pounds) to 20,400 kilograms (45,000 pounds). The additional cost savings were es-
timated to be only about $70 million in the development program. Furthermore, the orbiter with the
smaller payload compartment was unable to accommodate about 10 percent of the projected civil
missions and about 37 percent of the projected military missions for a typical mission model for the
period 1979- 1990. Therefore, the smaller shuttle would have required retention of large expendable
boosters in the U.S. launch vehicle inventory to handle the larger payloads, thus incurring higher
costs than were achievable with the baseline shuttle system.
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The Mark I/Mark II concept would have used Saturn F-1 engines but nevertheless would have been
a costly and relatively high-risk undertaking since, again, two manned returnable vehicles were re-
quired to be developed. Its development cost was estimated at between $6 and $7 billion with a cost
per flight of approximately $7 million. In a further attempt to reduce the development cost, studies
were initiated to examine a shuttle configuration utilizing an unmanned ballistic booster.
Evolution to the Current Shuttle Configuration
The introduction of the external tank orbiter had a major impact on the booster element of the shut-
tle system. Since the orbiter became much more efficient, it became possible to let it take even more
of the burden of propelling the shuttle into orbit. Staging could therefore occur at about 5,000 feet
per second. An important advantage from the use of the external tank orbiter was the opportunity to
utilize ballistic liquid boosters or solid rocket motor boosters that are efficient at the lower staging
velocities. Their use promised the greatest reduction in development costs.
The ballistic unmanned booster studied included both pressure-fed and pump-fed liquid propellant
boosters and solid propellant boosters. The two liquids compared as follows:
In the pressure-fed system, the engine would have been a major new development. In the pump-fed
system, it would have been a modified F-1 engine (the engines used in the Saturn V booster).
New manufacturing techniques would be required for the pressure-fed booster; conventional tech-
niques developed for Saturn would be used for the pump-fed.
Major modification of facilities would be required for the pressure-fed booster; to a large extent, ex-
isting facilities could be used for the pump-fed booster with minor modifications.
The stiff, thick walls of the pressure-fed booster could withstand a moderately high impact velocity,
and thus it lent itself to booster recovery. Recovery of the thin-walled pump-fed booster appeared to
be of much higher risk.
It was concluded that the pump-fed system had cost advantages and lower technical risk in all as-
pects except the recovery risk, which appeared large. Of the two liquids, the pump-fed concept was
deemed more advantageous in spite of the need to develop complex recovery systems.
After we examined the liquid booster class, a comparison was then made against solid rocket motor
configuration. Conventional expendable pump-fed systems currently exist in the series burn con-
figuration where the orbiter engines are ignited after booster shutdown and separation. However, a
parallel burn configuration where both booster and orbiter engines are ignited at liftoff takes maxi-
mum advantage of the high performance orbiter engines. This parallel burn configuration is par-
ticularly attractive for the solids where it is desirable to stage at a low velocity and to minimize the
size of solids for operational cost reasons. The pump-fed liquid booster in the series configuration
was therefore compared with the parallel burn solid rocket motor booster.
Due to the high cost for each pump-fed booster, recovery refurbishment and reusability are essen-
tial, while for the SRM this is not so critical. Essentially, the net cost of losing a liquid booster would
be much greater than losing a solid, jeopardizing the ability of the shuttle to attain the low costs of
recurrent operations. In addition, providing recovery would entail major developmental risks for the
liquid but would be simpler for the solids.
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Development costsofthe solidboosterare estimated tobe about $700 millionfewer than those ofthe
liquidbooster.Environmental effectsforboth liquidand solidsystems were about the same with one
exceptionmpropellants and theirexhaust products.The liquidboosterwould use RP, a kerosene-like
rocket propellant,and liquidoxygen, and itsexhaust products would be chieflycarbon monoxide,
water vapor, and carbon dioxide,along with smaller quantitiesofhydrocarbons and ammonia. The
chiefemissions from the solidrocket motors are hydrogen chloride,carbon monoxide, water vapor,
and aluminum oxide.
Itwas finallydetermined that,ofthe unmanned ballisticboosters,the solidboosterrecoverable sys-
tem with parallelorbiterburn would give the lowest development cost($5.15billion),leastcapital
riskper flight,and lowest technicalriskof development. In addition,economic studieshave shown
that thissystem willprovide the highest rate ofreturn on investment. Environmental effectswould
be minor, although itwould be necessary to impose additional but acceptable constraints on
launches associatedwith the likelihoodofrain.
Summary
Preliminary design studiesofthe initialtwo-stage fullyreusable concept showed that the sizeofthe
system and itsdevelopment costcould be greatlyreduced through the use ofan external expendable
liquid-hydrogen tank forthe orbiter,with a small increase in operating costsper launch. Further
study showed that additional costsavings and technicaladvantages in the development program
would accrue ifboth the liquid-oxygen and liquid-hydrogen forthe orbiterwere carriedin an exter-
nal tank jettisonedfrom orbit.This change permitted the orbitervehicleto be significantlysmaller
and more efficient,thereby simplifyingthe boosterdevelopment and reducing substantiallythe de-
velopment and procurement costsat the expense of some additional increase in the recurring cost
per flight.Consideration ofallfactorsled to the selectionofthe solidrocket motor booster,parallel
burn system forthe Space Shuttle.All configurationcomparative issueshave been studied in great
detailboth inand outsideofNASA, toevolve thismost cost-effectivespace transportationsystem.
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Resources for NASA Managers
by William M. Lawbaugh
What's New in the Library Collection
Following is a listof books and articlesthat
have most recently been added to the PPM
Library Collection.All of the materials may be
borrowed through interlibrary loan from you
Center Library except the Summer Study
documentation. (The sheer volume of paper
makes this study difficultto circulate.)Call
202/453-8740 or FTS 8-453-8740 for further
information.
Project Management Summer 1991 Study
documentation, which includes 10 volumes of
information plus individual papers and earlier
NASA management studies.
The Organizational Behavior Reader
Edited by David A Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin, and
Joyce S.Oslond
5th ed. 1991. Call Number HF5548.8 .K552
1991.
Thinking About Management
by Theodore Levitt, 1991.
Call Number: HD31 .L3848 1991.
Quality Training: What Top Companies
Have Learned
by Kathryn L. Try
The Conference Board Report Number 959,
1991. Call Number: HF5549.5 .T76 1991.
NASA, Maintaining the Program Balance,
National Academy of Public Administration,
1991. CallNumber: TL521.312 .N374
A Report by the Academy Panel examining the
distributionof NASA science and engineering
work between NASA and contractors and the
effecton NASA's in-house technicalcapability.
Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making
and Cases
by O.C. Ferrell, 1991.
Call Number: HF5387 .F47 1991.
CASE: Computer-Aided Software
Engineering
by T.G. Lewis, 1991.
Call Number: QA76.758 .L49 1991.
Project Management: How to Plan and
Manage Successful Projects
by Joan Knutson, American Management Asso-
ciation, 1991.
Call Number: T56.8 .K58 1991.
System Engineering Management
by Benjamin S.Blanchard, 1991.
A Wiley-lntersciencePublication seriesentitled
New Dimensions in Engineering. Call Number:
TAI68 .B53 1991.
A Review of the Office of Aeronautics and
Space Technology's Management Processes
and Practices
by the National Academy of Public Administra-
tion, 1991.
Call Number: TL521. 312 .R48 1988.
NASA Project Status Reports:
Congressional Requirements Can be Met,
but Reliability Must be Insured
General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-90-40,
1990. Call Number: T58.4 .U55 1990.
Articles
Risk Management Integration with System
Engineering and Program Management,
by G. Vlay, presented at AIAA Space Programs
and Technologies Conference September 25-28,
1990. Call Number 91A10139.
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The Causes of Project Failure
by Jeffrey K. Pinto and Samuel J. Mantel, Jr. in
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Manage-
ment, Vol. 37, No. 4, November 1990, pp. 269-
276.
Call Number: 91A19889.
Can Space Exploration Survive the End of
the Cold War?
by Bruce Murray, Space Policy Vol. 7, No. 1,
February 1991, pp. 23-34.
Call Number 91A27566.
Risk Assessment and Program
Management
Jerold Haber, in Aerospace Testing Seminar
March 13-15, 1990, Proceedings of the Institute
of Environmental Sciences, pp. 31-38.
Call Number: 91A29698.
Concurrent Engineering: The Challenge for
the 90s
by Kevin M. Smith and Carol A. Marlin, pre-
sented at National Aerospace and Electronics
Conference, May 21-25, 1990, pp. 1313-1323.
Call Number: 91A31023.
The Explorer Platform Planning System:
An Application of a Resource Reasoning
Planning Shell
by David R. McLean, Brenda J. Page and Wil-
liam J. Potter, in Proceedings of the ESA Sym-
posium June 26-29, 1990, ESA SP-308, October
1990. Call Number 91N22222.
Mars: A Generic Mission Planning Tool
by A. Killner, N. Schielow, F. Zapp, in Proceed-
ings of the ESA Symposium June 26-29, 1990,
ESA SP-308, October 1990.
Call Number 91N22238.
Manager's Handbook for Software
Development Revision 1
November 1990, Goddard Space Flight Center,
Software Engineering Laboratory Series, SEL-
84-101.
Call Number 91N15773.
Book Reviews
Government-Industry Project
Management Terminology and
Documentation Manual
(HD 69 .P75 G68 1991)
This 130-page manual is compiled by an Air
Force support contractor in order to serve as a
course training tool and to propose standard ter-
minology for the project office, contractor, sub-
contractor and user. Presumably, when they all
speak the same language and mean the same
things, teamwork will result.
The loose-leaf Terminology and Documentation
Manual begins with a rather odd "List of Acro-
nyms and Abbreviations" with only one abbre-
viation: "Synth." for Synthesizer. Some you will
find nowhere else (such as "WAG" for "wild ana-
tomical guess"), while more standard acronyms,
such as WAD for Work Authorization Docu-
ment, or WAN for Wide Area Network, are
missing.
Section 2 is a 60-page "Definition of Terms,"
again somewhat arbitrary and incomplete. Defi-
nitions range from the obvious ("Teamwork.
Working together to achieve a common goal.") to
the oblique ("Tiger Team. Focused visibility,
evaluation and recommendations by objective
specialists relative to an identified area of con-
cern."). In its "System Hierarchical Structure,"
a "part" is ranked as lowest and "system" as
highest, above "element" and "segment."
Section 3 is "Control State Descriptions," begin-
ning with Source Selection Initiation Review
(SSIR) and ending with Operational Readiness
Review (ORR). This is perhaps the most valu-
able part of the manual because of its Q/A for-
mat and detail. Section 4, "System Documenta-
tion: Content and Outlines," however, is least
helpful because of its sketchiness. Section 5,
"Symbols," is a mere couple of pages on arbi-
trary symbols and a master schedule.
This manual, despiteitsshortcomings, isa start
towards a reliable,consistent and comprehen-
sive glossary for projectmanagement. A better
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one may be the PPMI Lexicon by Dennis E.
Fielder, available through the PPM Library col-
lection.
Defense Acquisition Management Policies
and Procedures
(DoD Instruction 5000.2: February 23, 1991)
In the past, Department of Defense acquisition
management policies and procedures were pub-
lished in dozens of separate directives and
instructions. While they were all cross-
referenced, they "defied practical use" by man-
agers and contractors alike. This instruction
consolidates 45 such documents into about 500
pages for the program manager, milestone deci-
sion authorities and their staffs along functional
and organizational lines.
Besides general acquisition policies and proce-
dures, DoD Instruction 5000.2 covers require-
ments planning, risk management, systems en-
gineering, configuration and data management,
contracts, program control and test and evalua-
tion activities in support of the acquisition pro-
cess.
Acquisition in the DoD has been an issue of keen
interest in the past decade. Understandably,
part of the problem has been the maze of laws,
directives and instructions that go in and out of
effect. The instruction would go a long way to-
wards fair, consistent and coordinated acquisi-
tion in defense programs were it not for its
dense, abstract writing.
Systems Engineering Handbook. 2 Volumes
(Systems Analysis Division: Marshall Space
Flight Center, 1991)
Faced with the impending retirement of many
experienced engineers, MSFC saw the need "to
capture their knowledge and make it available
to the next generation of systems engineers."
The result is two well written, well organized
volumes, nicknamed "roadmap" and "toolbox."
Volume I, completed in February 1991, is 117
pages entitled "Overview and Processes," show-
ing "how MSFC does it." After a brief overview
of the NASA phased project planning process
(phases A to D), Volume I covers the entire sys-
tems engineering process from planning and
definition to post-mission evaluation. Tying it
all together in an elaborate process flow chart,
the "roadmap," which is reduced and highlight-
ed in each section to show how the topic fits in
the larger scheme of systems engineering.
The "toolbox" of Volume II was completed in
May 1990 and is twice as thick. This volume
consists of documentation, applicable specifica-
tions and standards, analyses and checklist, pro-
cesses and checklist, and summary of systems
engineering tools and models, and a fascinating
list of lessons learned from past programs. Each
area is replete with templates and fact sheets
which explain the tools, techniques, analyses
and documentation formats. This volume is not
as tightly organized as Volume I, but contains
useful, valuable information.
While the text is readable and the figures are
clear, some of the schematics in Volume II are
overly complicated and the Volume I introduc-
tion refers wrongly to the "roadmap" as Figure
12 (not 11). Nevertheless, MSFC's Systems En-
gineering Handbook is a good start in an in-
creasingly important and detailed discipline.
The Space Station Decision: Incremental
Politics and Technical Choice
by Howard E. McCurdy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1990)
Under contract with NASA, American Universi-
ty public affairs professor Howard E. McCurdy
has produced the second in the New Series in
NASA History. (Henry Cooper's Before Lift-off
about Shuttle astronauts was first in the series.)
It comes right on the heels of Levine and Naray-
anan's Keeping the Dream Alive, which covers
much the same time period. Both accounts rely
heavily on the NASA History Office and its then
director, Dr. Sylvia Fries (spelled "Fires" in
McCurdy's acknowledgements) as well as inter-
views with some of the Space Station Task Force
members.
McCurdy's study, by far the most extensive to
date, focuses on that "one brief shining moment"
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in NASA between Apollo and the present which
has captured the imagination ofaerospace writ-
ers and researchers.The 1984 decisionto build
the space station says so much about NASA's
past and future,but so far none of the original
task force members has attempted to tell"the
insidestory."That story,not fullytoldin official
documents, has been patched together with in-
terviews,usually pointing toa particulartheory
or thesis.
ProfessorMcCurdy's thesisisimplied in the sub-
title:"Incremental Politicsand Technological
Choice," with the further implication that the
former affectsor even shapes the latter.The the-
sisissimple: The Apollo decade had focus,pur-
pose and commitment; during the next two dec-
ades, the civilspace program "settledinto the
swamp ofincremental politics."There was no vi-
sion,no goal.
Technological choice is another matter. NASA
came up with a way to get Americans to the
moon just 14 months after President Kennedy
approved the program. President Nixon got a
Shuttle configuration in March 1972, within
three months of approval.But forspace station,
"NASA slogged through a seriesofdesigns."Re-
member the power tower, dual keel, single
boom, revisedbaseline and rephasing?
What happened thisgo-around? McCurdy points
to two inherent problems which suggest decep-
tion.Firstwas cost.The original$8 billioncost
estimate was not at all realistic.Not even a
stripped-down station could be launched for
that.Secondly, the originalspace stationprom-
ised too much to too many. Defense may have
wanted an observation post but the Europeans
did not want military presence; lifescientists
people wanted a large,active crew, but materi-
als scientistsneeded microgravity and Mars-
mission people preferreda servicestationforre-
fueling.The reader is leftwondering whether
the present-day problems with funding and con-
figurationare a resultofraw, deceptive politics
or bad technologicalchoices made in the past.
Perhaps eitheror both would be gross oversim-
plification,as a strong case could be made for
other debilitatingfactorssuch as history (espe-
ciallythe impact of the Challenger disaster),
management (personnel and methodology), age
distribution(thenatural aging ofApollo-era em-
ployees),not to mention public relationsor the
1981 tax cut.
Elsewhere, for example, McCurdy has argued
that Apollo-era NASA was "hands-on" techno-
logicallycompetent, but laterbecame noted for
itscontractingout.(See Space Policy,November
1989, for example.) Such a theory would either
enhance or disprove histhesisin The Space Sta-
tionDecision,but itwould more than likelyalter
the book'ssubtitle.Perhaps the problem iswhat
appears to be long gap between research and
writing. The book came out in late 1990, but
most of the firsthand interviews took place in
1985 and 1986.
Nevertheless, the decisionto build Space Sta-
tion Freedom is fraught with intense interest,
scrutiny and even mystery. Additional studiesof
this1984 decisionare forthcoming, and each one
will understandably add another perspective,
other insights. For now, though, McCurdy's
book isthe book on the subject;for how long de-
pends on insiders or Task Force members who
take up the pen.
Project Management Tools for Engineering
and Management Professionals
by Adediji B. Badiru
(Norcross, GA: Industrial Engineering and
Management Press, Institute of Industrial Engi-
neers, 1991)
This assistant professorof industrialengineer-
ing at University of Oklahoma describes his
book as "a collection of project management
tools.., for the engineering and management
professional."Itpresumes prior knowledge and
previous study of most of these "tools" for none is
described or explained in any detail. MBO, for
example, is given two thin paragraphs; so is
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs; McGregor's The-
ory X and Theory Y gets three paragraphs; TQM
four. However, an awful lot of "tools" are men-
tioned in the 428 pages of text and appendices,
and in about 150 figures and tables. The tools re-
ceiving the most attention are WBS, CPM,
PERT, Gantt charts and MARR (minimum at-
tractive rate of return) methods.
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If Badiru has a theme or point of view in his
compilation, it would be this: "In the real world,
there are no right answers. There are only op-
tions." He explains that new engineers quickly
find that the theoretical and quantitative tech-
niques of project management learned in school
do not necessarily apply in the "real" world.
More often than not, the practical mana-ger
must settle for a "near-optimal" alternative in
lieu of a perfect solution. H.A. Simm discovered
this reality nearly 40 years ago and dubbed it
"satisficing." Badiru applies the concept to pro-
ject management decision making.
The author is strong on the economic aspects
and quantitative analysis of project manage-
ment, but his most originalapproach isthe area
of software tools for project managers. He
evaluates 19 software programs, from Microsoft
Projectto Control Project,most ofwhich can run
on personal computers. However, this rather
unique effortmay also date the book quickly as
new software forprojectmanagement comes on
the market and old programs are updated and
improved. Even in the time ittook to finishthe
book, prices changed dramatically. Artemis
Project,for example, is listedat $5,000 for a
single copy in the text but at $3,500 in the
Appendix. Likewise, Harvard ProjectManager
software is listed at $695 in the text but a
hundred dollars less 50 pages later. To
compensate, another handy appendix supplies
addresses and telephone number for major
software developers in the field of project
management.
Beyond the Myths and Magic of Mentoring:
How to Facilitate an Effective Mentoring
Program
by Margo Murry, with Mama A. Owen
(San Francisco: Jessey-Bass Publishers,1991)
A lot of people are talking about "mentoring"
these days, yet littleis written about it,even
though itisan ancient concept. Itdates back at
leastto Homer, who chroniclesthe appointment
of Mentor who looks after Telemachus for a
decade untilthe boy'sfather,Odysseus, returns
from the siege of Troy. Today itis perhaps the
latestbuzzword in management circles.
Yet, as the authors ofthisbook note, mentoring
"has been applauded as the best and criticizedas
the worst thing thatcan happen in one'scareer."
They stateflatly,"some organizations and some
people willnever be ready formentoring."
The authors are president and senior associate
of a firm called "MMHA-The Managers' Men-
tors, Inc.," although the acronym is not spelled
out. In trying to explain mentoring, they say it
has nothing to do with role models, "distant
stars" or sponsors. Rather, they call it "facilitat-
ed mentoring" which involves a mentor and a
protege in a formal but willing relationship of
sharing skills or experience, systematically.
Perhaps the clearest example of a successful
mentoring program cited is at Trinity College in
Washington, D.C. Here, undergraduate
students are paired with alumnae in the same
professional field who together negotiate a set of
activities they will share over the semester.
Companies and government agencies are also
cited as having formal or informal mentoring
program. The IRS mentoring program in
Kansas City, for example, encourages
professional and personal growth.
To make mentoring work, the authors suggest a
pilot program first, then plenty of planning,
training, coordination and evaluation. They are
not blind to gender and culture issues in the
workplace, such as sexism and racism. Unions
are seen as more of a help than a hindrance in
the mentoring process, providing grievance pro-
cedures and due process when problems arise.
They also recognize the Yankee streaks of inde-
pendence in American business: "We do not
have the patience of the Japanese nor the true
team spirit of the Scandinavians... Meanwhile,
divorce statistics in the United States prove that
we are becoming worse at managing relation-
ships." The key, the authors say, is "persistence"
to bring about the benefits of facilitated mentor-
ing.
So far, "facilitated mentoring" seems to work
best in schools and charitable organizations
where supports systems are already in place to
compensate for the greed, sabotage and selfish-
ness often attributed to people climbing the lad-
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der in corporateAmerica. Whether mentoring
takes hold in governmentor industry may de-
pend uponwhether the conceptis presentedin
trendy workshops or in serious studies. This
bookis a modeststart.
Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory
and American Propulsion Technology
by Virginia P.Dawson
(Washington: NASA SP-4306,1991)
In 1982 it looked like the beginning of the end
for Lewis Research Center (LeRC). Staffing was
down from 4,200 in 1971 to just 2,690 in ten
years. The 1983 aeronautics budget had been
halved by the Reagan budget trimmers. The
then-influential Heritage Foundation marked
Lewis for extinction in their blueprint, Agenda
for Progress, by recommending the abolition of
all of NASA's civil aeronautics programs. The
city of Cleveland had recently declared bank-
ruptcy. And the newly appointed Center Direc-
tor resigned.
Within five years, Lewis phased out its famed
energy research and was no longer a basic re-
search laboratory where most of the work was
done in-house. But it was still alive. In fact, em-
ployment picked up considerably at Lewis with
several new programs, including the Shuttle-
Centaur program and the space power system
work package for the Space Station Freedom
Program. In the words of division chief William
"Red" Robbins, "It was a damn miracle!"
Although Engines and Innovation is part of the
NASA History Series, author-historian Virginia
Dawson modestly disclaims this is neither "an
administrative history of LeRC nor a chronicle
of its achievements." Rather, she says, "I hope
that my book is a contribution to the current ef-
fort among historians of technology to under-
stand technological innovation as a social activ-
ity or process." In that, she succeeds admirably
in a well-written book which captures the es-
sence of technology transfer in the NACA and
NASA eras. For example, she notes that Case
Institute of Technology was on the receiving end
of LeRC's expertise in gas turbine and rocket
technology until it developed graduate pro-
grams and the situation reversed.
Dawson thematically traces the rise and fall and
rise again of Lewis Research Center from its cre-
ation in 1941 as the NACA Aircraft Engine Re-
search Laboratory (AERL) by NACA Director
(from 1924-1947) George Lewis. By the end of
the war it became known as the Flight Propul-
sion Research Laboratory to reflect jet propul-
sion and rocket research. NASA was formed in
1958 and the lab took on its present name as it
began crucial research in nuclear rocket sys-
tems at the old Plum Brook Station 50 miles
west.
Dawson, a Ph.D. in the history of science and
technology from Case Western Reserve, began
work on this project in 1984 under contract to
the NASA History Office, virtually from
scratch. Only one book had been published on
the topic, and that covered only liquid hydrogen
propulsion at LeRC from 1945 to 1959. An un-
published M.A. thesis helped with the war
years, along with personal interviews with such
LeRC legends as Abe Silverstein, Ben and Ir-
ving Pinkel, and Bruce Lundin. However, the
fascinating story, published in 1991, virtually
ends in 1984; neither Andrew Stofan nor John
Klineberg was even interviewed. She concludes
that the challenge for LeRC is to restore "a bal-
ance between research and development."
To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure
in Successful Design
by Henry Petroski
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985)
"To understand what engineering is and what
engineers do is to understand how failures can
happen and how they can contribute more than
success to advance technology." Thus, Henry Pe-
troski, an engineering professor at Duke Uni-
versity, begins his now-classic study of the hu-
man side of engineering.
You do not need to be an engineer to under-
stand, appreciate and enjoy this slim, illustrated
book of 250 pages. He begins with a clear ac-
count of the 1981 collapse of the Kansas City
Hyatt Regency Hotel skywalks and ends with
his telling search of a famous Santayana quota-
tion: "Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it."
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Much of the early part ofthe book istaken up
with fairy tales (Goldilocks, the Three Little
Pigs) and poetry (Oliver Wendell Holmes' "The
Deacon's Masterpiece," about "the wonderful
one-hoss shay, that was built in such a logical
way") to illustratehispointthat "successisfore-
seeing failure."No engineer wants to learn by
mistakes,says Petroski,but there isnot enough
tolearnfrom successesto go beyond the state-of-
the-art.
The hero-engineers are the Roebling brothers
(Brooklyn Bridge) and Joseph Paxton, who built
the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. They were
engineers who had vision and creativity.His
bridge storiesare most memorable, especially
the undulating Tacoma Narrows Bridge.
In the finalchapters,however, Petroski reveals
himself as a stick-in-the-mud, an incurable
romantic. His narrative "from slide rule to
computer" suggests that the latter can be
attributedto "computer-aided disasters"such as
the roof collapse of the Hartford Civic Center,
while the former forcesan engineer torely upon
common sense and conventional wisdom in
design. Nevertheless, as Petroski admits, it
would be impossible to design or build a
megaproject,likea nuclear power plant,without
computer technology.
One event that makes To Engineer Is Human a
classic is the fact that a 50-minute film was sub-
sequently made by Films Incorporated, bearing
same title, starring the author. In the film ver-
sion, Petroski begins with the Challenger disas-
ter and ends with a successful night time launch
of the Shuttle. Again, the focus is upon bridges,
but his humanistic ideas are illustrated nicely
with shots of pyramids and cathedrals. The PBS-
quality film and book are complementary in
showing failure and fatigue as useful design
concepts.
Computer Applications for Project Manage-
ment: An Overview
by Robert Mead, (Huntsville, AL: Carnber
Corporation, February 1991)
This brief, 50-page outline of computer applica-
tions is a resource for a project manager who
seeks information on some very basic computer
applications. It is not for the expert. No one
needs to be convinced that "computer systems
can help the project manager/planner by doing
some project management functions better, fas-
ter, more accurately." Choosing the systems is
the main thrust of this presentation, but, as the
author observes, "This is an area of dynamic
change." Better to seek out advice from periodi-
cals, professionals, user groups and consultants.

